Hedging Strategy For Commodity Risk (J&L Railroad (UVA-F-1053)) Study Questions
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UVA-F-1053 Rev. Aug. 18, 2009
This disguised case was revised and updated by Rick Green based on an earlier version adapted from a Supervised
Business Study written by Jeannine Lehman under the direction of Professor Kenneth Eades. Funding was provided
by the L. White Matthews Fund for finance case writing. Copyright 1994 by the University of Virginia Darden
School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to
sales@dardenbusinesspublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev. 8/09.
J&L RAILROAD
It was Saturday, April 25, 2009, and Jeannine Matthews, chief financial officer at J&L
Railroad (J&L), was in the middle of preparing her presentation for the upcoming board of
directors meeting on Tuesday. Matthews was responsible for developing alternative strategies to
hedge the company’s exposure to locomotive diesel-fuel prices for the next 12 months. In
addition to enumerating the pros and cons of alternative hedging strategies, the board had asked
for her recommendation for which strategy to follow.
Fuel prices had always played a significant role in J&L’s profits, but management had
not considered the risk important enough to merit action. During February as the board reviewed
the details of the company’s performance for 2008, they discovered that, despite an increase of
$154 million in rail revenues, operating margin had shrunk by $114 million, largely due to an
increase in fuel costs (Exhibits 1 and 2). Having operating profit fall by 11% in 2008 after it had
risen 9% in 2007 was considered unacceptable by the board, and it did not want a repeat in 2009.
Recently in a conversation with Matthews, the chairman of the board had expressed his
personal view of the problem:
Our business is running a railroad, not predicting the strength of an oil cartel or
whether one Middle East nation will invade another. We might have been lucky in
the past, but we cannot continue to subject our shareholders to unnecessary risk.
After all, if our shareholders want to speculate on diesel fuel prices, they can do
that on their own; but I believe fuel-price risk should not be present in our stock
price. On the other hand, if the recession continues and prices drop further, we
could increase our profit margins by not hedging.
Diesel-fuel prices had peaked in early July 2008 but then had trended downward as a
result of the worldwide recession and softening demand. By January 2009, diesel-fuel prices had
fallen to their lowest level since early 2005. At February’s meeting, the board had decided to
wait and see how the energy markets would continue to react to the recession and softening
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demand. By March, however, oil and diesel-fuel prices had begun to rebound, so the board
charged Matthews with the task of proposing a hedging policy at the meeting on April 28.
It was industry practice for railroads to enter into long-term contracts with their freight
customers, which had both good and bad effects. On the positive side, railroads could better
predict available resources by locking in revenues in advance. On the negative side, fixed-price
contracts limited railroads’ profit margins and exposed them to potentially large profit swings if
any of their costs changed. In this regard, diesel fuel was a particularly troublesome cost for
railroads, because it represented a large cost item that also was difficult to predict due to the
volatility of fuel prices.
An ideal solution to the fuel-price risk would be for railroads to enter into long-term
fixed-price contracts with their fuel suppliers. A fixed-price contract with suppliers when
combined with the fixed-price contracts with freight customers would serve to steady future
profits. Moreover, by contracting with fuel suppliers to deliver all of J&L’s fuel needs at a fixed
price, management could be assured of meeting its fuel budget numbers at year’s end. At times,
fuel suppliers had agreed to such contracts, but over the years, J&L had not been satisfied with
the results. The problem was that when fuel prices had risen substantially, many suppliers
walked away from their commitments leaving J&L with a list of three unattractive options:
1. Force compliance: J&L could take the supplier to court to enforce the contract; however, many suppliers were thinly capitalized, which meant that the legal action against them
could put them into bankruptcy. As a result, J&L might get little or nothing from the
supplier and yet would be saddled with significant legal fees.
2. Negotiate a new price: This usually meant that J&L would agree to pay at or near the current market price, which was equivalent to ignoring the original contract; plus it set a
bad precedent for future contracts.
3. Walk away and buy the fuel on the open market from another supplier: This choice avoided “rewarding” the supplier for defaulting on its contract but was functionally
equivalent to never having the contract in the first place.
Based on this history, J&L’s board decided to “assume the fuel suppliers are not the
answer to our fuel price problem.” The board then asked Matthews to explore other alternatives
to manage the fuel risk and preserve J&L’s relationships with the fuel suppliers.
Mathews had determined that, if J&L were to hedge, it could choose between two basic
strategies. The first was to do the hedging in-house by trading futures and options contracts on a
public exchange. This presented a number of tradeoffs, including the challenge of learning how
to trade correctly. The second was to use a bank’s risk management products and services. This
would cost more but would be easier to implement. For either alternative, she would need to
address a number of important details, including how much fuel to hedge and how much risk
should be eliminated with the hedge.
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Railroad Industry
Railroads hauled record amounts of freight in 2006 and 2007 and began to encounter
capacity constraints. In 2008, the industry hauled nearly 2-billion tons of freight, although rail
traffic declined due to weakness in the economy. The transportation of coal was by far the
number one commodity group carried. Other significant commodity groups were chemicals,
farm products, food, metallic ores, nonmetallic minerals, and lumber, pulp, and paper products.
Freight and unit trains had expanded the industry since deregulation in the 1980s. Rail
carriers served as long-distance haulers of intermodal freight, carrying the freight containers for
steamship lines, or trailers for the trucking industry. Unit train loads were used to move large
amounts of a single commodity (typically 50 or more cars) between two points using more
efficient locomotives. A unit train would be used, for example, to move coal between a coal
mine and an electric generating plant.
Several factors determined a railroad’s profitability: government regulation, oligopolistic
competition within the industry, and long-term contracts with shippers and suppliers. The
railroad industry had a long history of price regulation; the government had feared the
monopolistic pricing that had driven the industry to the brink of ruin in the 1970s. Finally
recognizing the intense competition among most rail traffic, Congress passed the Staggers Rail
Act of 1980, allowing railroads to manage their own assets, to price services based on market
demand, and earn adequate revenues to support their operations. America’s freight railroads paid
almost all of the costs of tracks, bridges, and tunnels themselves. In comparison, trucks and
barges used highways and waterways provided and maintained by the government.
After the Staggers Act was passed, railroad fuel efficiency rose 94%. By 2009, a freight
train could move a ton of freight 436 miles on a single gallon of locomotive diesel fuel,
approximately four times as far as it could by truck. The industry had spent considerable money
on the innovative technology that improved the power and efficiency of locomotives and
produced lighter train cars. Now, a long freight train could carry the same load as 280 trucks
while at the same time producing only one-third the greenhouse-gas emissions.1
Market share was frequently won or lost solely on the basis of the price charged by
competing railroads. Although rarely more than two or three railroads competed for a particular
client’s business, price competition was often fierce enough to prohibit railroads from increasing
freight prices because of fuel-price increases. But, as fuel prices during 2008 climbed higher and
faster than they had ever done before, there was some discussion in the railroad industry
regarding the imposition of fuel surcharges when contracts came up for renewal. So far,
however, none of the major carriers had followed up the talk with action.
1 Association of American Railroads, http://www.freightrailworks.org.
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J&L Railroad
J&L Railroad was founded in 1928 when the Jackson and Lawrence rail lines combined
to form one of the largest railroads in the country. Considered a Class I railroad, J&L operated
approximately 2,500 miles of line throughout the West and the Midwest. Although publicly
owned, J&L was one of the few Class I railroads still managed by the original founding families.
In fact, two of the family members still occupied seats on its board of directors. During the
periods 1983–89, 1996–99, and 2004–08, J&L had invested significant amounts of capital into
replacing equipment and refurbishing roadways. These capital expenditures had been funded
either through internally generated funds or through long-term debt. The investment in more
efficient locomotives was now paying off, despite the burden of the principal and interest
payments.
J&L had one of the most extensive intermodal networks, accounting for approximately
20% of revenues during the last few years, as compared to the Class I industry average of 10%.
Transportation of coal, however, had accounted for only 25% to 30% of freight revenues. With
the projected increase in demand for coal from emerging economies in Asia, management had
committed to increase revenues from coal to 35% within three years. That commitment was now
subject to revision due to slowing global economic activity and the recent fall in energy prices.
Exchange-Traded Contracts
J&L’s exposure to fuel prices during the next 12 months would be substantial. Matthews
estimated that the company would need approximately 17.5 million gallons of diesel fuel per
month or 210 million gallons for the coming year. This exposure could be offset with the use of
heating oil futures and option contracts that were traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) (Exhibits 3 and 4). NYMEX did not trade contracts on diesel fuel, so it was not
possible to hedge diesel fuel directly. Heating oil and diesel fuel, however, were both distillates
of crude oil with very similar chemical profiles and highly correlated market prices (Exhibit 5).
Thus, heating-oil futures were considered an excellent hedging instrument for diesel fuel.
Futures allowed market participants to contract to buy or sell a commodity at a future
date at a predetermined price. If market participants did not want to buy a commodity today
based on its spot price, the current market price, they could use the futures market to contract to
buy it at a future date at the futures price. A futures price reflected the market’s forecast of what
the spot price was expected to be at the contract’s maturity date. Many factors influenced the
spot price and futures prices, both of which changed constantly depending on the market news.
With current market conditions, the futures market was expecting price to trend up from the spot
of $1.36 to an average of $1.52 over the next 12 months.
A trader who wanted to buy a commodity would take a “long” position in the contract,
whereas a seller would take a “short” position. Because J&L’s profits fell when fuel prices
increased, the company could offset its exposure by taking long positions in heating-oil futures.
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For example, instead of waiting two months to buy fuel on the open market at the going price,
J&L could enter into the July futures contract on April 25 to buy heating oil at $ 1.4138/gallon
(Exhibit 3). Therefore, when the contract matured in two months,2 J&L could buy heating oil at
exactly $1.4138/gallon regardless of the price of heating oil at the time. This could work for or
against J&L depending on whether prices rose or fell during the two months. For example, if at
maturity of the contract, heating oil was selling at $1.4638, J&L would have benefited by
$.05/gallon by owning the futures. If heating oil was selling for $1.3638 at maturity, J&L would
have lost $.05/gallon on the futures. In either case, however, J&L would pay exactly $1.4138 per
gallon and would face no uncertainty about the net price paid after entering into the July futures
contract.
Fuel producers or distributors who wanted to fix their selling price would take a short
position in the fuel futures. Alternatively, the seller might be a speculator who believed that the
spot price of fuel at maturity would end up being lower than the current futures price. In either
case, futures was a zero-sum game because one party’s gain exactly equals the other party’s loss.
As long as the futures price was an unbiased estimate of the future spot price, the expected
payoff at maturity was zero for both the long and short side of the contract. Thus, although the
buyer and seller were required to pay a modest fee to the exchange to enter a futures contract, no
money was exchanged between buyers and sellers at the outset. If the futures price increased
over time, the buyer would collect, and if the futures price decreased, the seller would collect.
When the contract matured, it was rare for the buyer to request physical delivery of the
commodity, rather the vast majority of contracted futures were cash settled.
NYMEX futures created a few problems for J&L management. First, because J&L would
have to use heating-oil contracts to hedge its diesel-fuel exposure, there would be a small amount
of risk created by the imperfect match of the prices of the two commodities. This “basis,”
however, was minimal owing to the high correlation historically between the two price series. Of
greater concern was that NYMEX contracts were standardized with respect to size and maturity
dates. Each heating-oil futures contract was for the delivery of 42,000 gallons and matured on
the last business day of the preceding month. Thus, J&L faced a maturity mismatch because the
hedge would only work if the number of gallons being hedged was purchased specifically on the
day the futures contract matured. In addition, J&L faced a size mismatch because the number of
gallons needed in any month was unlikely to equal an exact multiple of 42,000 gallons.
Some institutional features of NYMEX futures contracts had to be considered as well.
NYMEX futures were “marked to market” daily, which meant that every investor’s position was
settled daily, regardless of whether the position was closed or kept open. Daily marking-to-
market limited the credit risk of the transaction to a single day’s movement of prices. To further
reduce the credit risk, the exchange required margin payments as collateral. When a contract was
initially opened, both parties were required to post an initial margin equal to approximately 5%
or less of the contract value. At the end of each trading day, moneys were added or subtracted
from the margin account as the futures trader’s position increased or decreased in value. If the
2 NYMEX futures expired on the last trading day of the previous month; therefore, the July futures matured on
June 30, 2009.
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value of the position declined below a specified maintenance level, the trader would be required
to replenish the margin to its initial margin level. Thus, the combination of daily marking-to-
market and the use of margins effectively eliminated any credit risk for exchange-traded futures
contracts. Still, the daily settlement process created a cash-flow risk because J&L might have to
make cash payments well in advance of the maturity of a contract.
In addition to futures contracts, it was possible to buy NYMEX options on the futures. A
call option gave the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to go long on the underlying
commodity futures at a given price (the strike price) on or before the expiration date. A put
option gave the buyer the right to go short on the futures at the strike price. The typical futures
option expired a few days prior to the expiration of the underlying futures contract to give the
counterparties time to offset their positions on the futures exchange. Options were offered at a
variety of strike prices and maturities (Exhibit 4). Unlike the underlying futures contract, puts
and calls commanded a market price called the premium. A call premium increased as the spread
of the futures price over the strike price increased, whereas a put premium increased as the
spread of the strike price over the futures price increased. The premiums of both puts and calls
were higher for options with more time to maturity. Thus, unlike the futures, option buyers had
to pay the premium to buy the contract in addition to both buyer and seller paying a fee for the
transaction.
The Risk-Management Group at Kansas City National Bank
Walt Bernard, vice president of the risk management group of Kansas City National
Bank, (KCNB) had recently given a presentation to J&L senior management in which he
described the wide range of risk-management products and techniques available to protect J&L’s
profit margin. Each technique used a particular financial product to hedge by various degrees
J&L’s exposure to diesel-fuel price changes. The products offered by KCNB were completely
financial in design (i.e., no actual delivery of the commodity took place at maturity). To hedge
diesel fuel, KCNB offered No. 2 heating-oil contracts, the same commodity traded on the
NYMEX. Also similar to trading on the NYMEX, working with KCNB meant that J&L could
continue to do business as usual with its suppliers and perform its hedging activities
independently.
The primary risk-management products offered by KCNB were commodity swaps, caps,
floors, and collars (see Exhibit 6 for cap and floor quotes). KCNB’s instruments were designed
to hedge the average price of heating oil during the contract period. By contrast, NYMEX
futures and options were contracts designed against the spot price in effect on the last day of the
contract. In a commodity swap, the bank agreed to pay on the settlement date if the average price
of heating oil was above the agreed-upon swap price for the year. Conversely, J&L would have
to pay the bank if the average price was below the contracted swap price. Thus, a swap was
essentially a custom-fit futures contract, with KCNB rather than NYMEX carrying the credit
risk. Because the swap was priced on the average heating-oil price, settlement occurred at the
end of the swap (12 months in J&L’s case) rather than daily as with NYMEX futures. In
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addition, KCNB would not require J&L to post a margin but would charge a nominal up-front
fee as compensation for accepting J&L’s credit risk. KCNB was currently quoting the 12-month
swap price for heating oil as $1.522/gallon.
KCNB also offered commodity options, referred to as caps, floors, and collars. A cap was
essentially a call option; a floor was a put option; and a collar was the combination of a cap and
a floor. For a cap, KCNB agreed to pay the excess of the realized average fuel price over the
cap’s “strike price.” If the average fuel price never reached the strike price, KCNB would pay
nothing. As for any option, J&L would need to pay KCNB a premium for the cap. The cap
premium varied according to how far the strike price was above the expected price. If the strike
was close to the expected price implied by the futures contracts, J&L would have to pay a
relatively high premium. If J&L was willing to accept some risk by contracting for a strike price
that was significantly higher than the expected average price, the premium would be smaller. In
any case, the cap would allow J&L to take advantage of price decreases and yet still be protected
from price increases above the cap’s strike price.
A commodity collar was used to limit the movement of prices within the range of the cap
and floor strike prices. By choosing a collar, J&L would be selling a floor while simultaneously
buying a cap. KCNB agreed to pay the excess, if any, of the average heating-oil price over the
cap strike price. Conversely, J&L would have to pay if the average price fell below the floor
strike price. Collars could be designed to have a minimal up-front cost by setting the cap and
floor strike prices so that the revenue derived from selling the floor exactly offset the premium
for buying the cap. If J&L management wanted to guard against prices rising above a certain
price (the cap’s strike price) but were willing to give up the benefit of prices falling below a
certain level (the floor’s strike price), a collar could be the logical choice.
Matthews’s Choice
Jeannine Matthews had decided to recommend that J&L hedge its fuel costs for the next
12 months, at least to some extent. Her analysis revealed that despite using more efficient
equipment, the cost of fuel as a percentage of revenues had increased every year since 2001
(Exhibit 7). The immediate questions to be answered were: How much fuel should be hedged,
and how should the hedge be structured?
Bernard had presented Matthews with a myriad of possibilities, each of which provided
some degree of profit protection. A commodity swap, for example, could be used to completely
fix the price of fuel for the next year. If the price of diesel fuel ended up falling below the swap
price, however, the hedge would be more of an embarrassment than a benefit to Matthews.
Defending a newly initiated hedging policy would be difficult if J&L’s profits lagged those of
other railroads because of a failure to capture lower fuel costs.
Then there was the issue of how much fuel to hedge. If the economy experienced a
slowdown, J&L would experience a drop in rail loads, which would result in using less than the
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210 million gallons currently expected. If the hedge was constructed based on more fuel than
needed, it was conceivable that J&L could end up paying to settle its position with the bank for
fuel that it could not use. At the same time, it was also possible that the economy would pick up,
and J&L would end up having to buy a significant amount of fuel on the open market without the
benefit of a hedge.
Instead of a swap, Matthews could use a cap to eliminate the risk of high fuel prices. This
would seem to alleviate the problem of over- or under-hedging because the cap would only be
exercised if it was profitable (i.e., if prices rose beyond the cap’s strike price). At that point, J&L
would prefer to have been over-hedged because the company would get a higher payoff from the
cap. The biggest concern about the cap strategy was that the price of heating oil might not rise
high enough to trigger the cap, in which case the premium paid for the cap would have only
served to reduce profits with no offsetting benefits. Another alternative was to enter into a collar,
which could be structured to have a zero cost; however, a collar carried a hidden cost because it
gave up the savings if fuel prices happened to fall below the floor’s strike price.
Matthews knew that it was important for her to keep in mind that all of KCNB’s product
could be mimicked using NYMEX futures and options. In fact, maybe there was a creative way
to combine NYMEX securities to give J&L a better hedge than provided by KCNB’s products.
Regardless of what she recommended, Matthews realized that she needed to devise a hedging
strategy that would give J&L the maximum benefit at the lowest cost and would not prove to be
an embarrassment for her or J&L.
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Exhibit 1
J&L RAILROAD
Consolidated Income Statement, 2006–08 (in millions of dollars)
December 31
2008 2007 2006
Revenues by market group:
Coal $1,080 $ 871 $ 857
Merchandise 1,907 1,954 1,878
Intermodal 714 722 725
Total operating revenues 3,701 3,547 3,461
Expenses:
Compensation and benefits 987 939 970
Purchased service and rent 588 571 581
Fuel 603 430 403
Depreciation 296 285 271
Materials and other 313 294 295
Total operating expenses 2,787 2,519 2,520
Operating income: 914 1,028 941
Other income 40 34 55
Interest expense, net (163) (162) (175)
Income (loss) before income taxes: 791 900 820
Income tax provision (297) (310) (276)
Net income $ 494 $ 589 $ 545
Source: Main Street Trading data.
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Exhibit 2
J&L RAILROAD
Consolidated Balance Sheets, 2007–08 (in millions of dollars)
December 31
Assets 2008 2007
Current assets: Cash $ 227 $ 76 Receivable net 320 347 Materials and suppliers, at average cost 71 65 Deferred income taxes, current 55 70 Other current assets 62 58 Total current assets 735 616
Properties:
Investment 654 726 Property, road and structures, net 8,184 7,940
Other assets 101 336
Total assets $9,674 $9,618
Liabilities and shareholders’ equity
Current liabilities: Accounts payable $ 419 $ 419
Current portion of long-term debt 96 75
Income taxes payable 81 87
Other accrued expenses 178 136
Total current liabilities 774 717
Long-term debt 2,275 2,207 Deferred income taxes 2,344 2,366 Other liabilities and reserves 747 750 Total liabilities 6,140 6,040
Shareholders’ equity: Common stock 135 140 Additional paid-in capital 618 539 Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) (347) (147) Retained income 3,128 3,046 Total shareholders’ equity 3,534 3,578 Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $9,674 $9,618
Source: Main Street Trading data.
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