Columbia Journalism Review

Visit the web site for the Columbia Journalism Review. The page I have directed you to below will lead you to a “resources” page on their web site. Using the drop down box on the left of that web page you will be able to choose a media company/corporation in order to identify all of their ownership holdings. The consolidation of media ownership has essentially consolidated the power of information in the hands of these companies. There is a top tier of ownership, meaning, there are approximately 6 of those companies that dominate the majority of media ownership.

Choose one of the following companies and tell me how many television, radio, publishing or production companies they own: Disney, GE, NewsCorp., etc… Then tell me how such ownership power might threaten democratic behavior in the United States.

www.cjr.org/resources/ (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

Argument Mapping

Assignment 1: Argument Mapping
Due Week 3 and worth 225 points

Write a four to five (4-5) page paper in which you:
(Note: Refer to Demonstration Exercise 3 located at the end of Chapter 1 for criteria 1-3.)

  1. Create an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and complete all the criteria provided in the demonstration exercise, beginning with this claim: “The U.S. should return to the 55- mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives.”
  2. Include in your map each of the following: warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals.
  3. Assume that the original qualifier was certainly; indicate whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument.

(Note: Refer to Demonstration Exercise 3 located at the end of Chapter 8 for criterion 4.)

  1. Apply the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should not intervene in the Balkans.
  2. Write a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: “The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else’s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily.”
  3. Complete an argument map to illustrate your analysis.
  4. Appropriately incorporate at least four (4) quality sources. A quality source can be either grey literature, such as a news article, or scholarly, such as peer reviewed works. In the case of public administration, government websites are appropriate quality resources. Note: Wikipedia, SparkNotes, and similar websites do not qualify as academic resources. Visit the Strayer University Library at http://research.strayer.edu to conduct research.

Your assignment must follow these formatting requirements:

  • Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references must follow APA. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.
  • Include a cover page containing the title of the assignment, the student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in the required assignment page length.
  • Use Microsoft Word, Microsoft Draw, PowerPoint, or other graphics program to create the arguments maps for the assignment. Whichever program you use, the graphical maps must be integrated into the Word Document and labeled as a Figure with a number and title. The argument maps are part of the page length.

The course learning outcome associated with this assignment is:

  • Critique the process of policy argument and development.

APA Format with included citations

Illustrations and Rubric Attached

Grading for this assignment will be based on answer quality, logic / organization of the paper, and language and writing skills, using the following rubric.

Points: 225 Assignment 1: Argument Mapping
Criteria Unacceptable Below 70% F Fair 70-79% C Proficient 80-89% B Exemplary 90-100% A
1. Create an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and complete all the criteria provided in Exercise 3, beginning with this claim: The U.S. should return to the 55- mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives.  Weight: 15% Did not submit or incompletely created an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and incompletely completed all the criteria provided in Exercise 3, beginning with this claim: The U.S. should return to the 55-mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives. Partially created an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and partially completed all the criteria provided in Exercise 3, beginning with this claim: The U.S. should return to the 55-mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives. Satisfactorily created an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and satisfactorily completed all the criteria provided in Exercise 3, beginning with this claim: The U.S. should return to the 55-mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives. Thoroughly created an argument map based on the influence diagram presented in Case 1.3 and throughly completed all the criteria provided in Exercise 3, beginning with this claim: The U.S. should return to the 55-mph speed limit in order to conserve fuel and save lives.
2. Include in the map as many warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals as possible. Weight: 15% Did not submit or incompletely included in the map as many warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals as possible. Partially included in the map as many warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals as possible. Satisfactorily included in the map as many warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals as possible. Thoroughly included in the map as many warrants, backings, objections, and rebuttals as possible.
3. Assume that the original qualifier was certainly; indicate whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument. Weight: 10% Did not submit or incompletely assumed that the original qualifier was certainly; did not submit or incompletely indicated whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument. Partially assumed that the original qualifier was certainly; partially indicated, whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument. Satisfactorily assumed that the original qualifier was certainly;satisfactorily indicated whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument. Thoroughly assumed that the original qualifier was certainly;thoroughly indicated, whether the qualifier changes as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument.
4. Apply the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should notintervene in the Balkans. (Refer to Demonstration Exercise 3, Chapter 8.) Weight: 15% Did not submit or incompletely applied the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should notintervene in the Balkans. Partially applied the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should notintervene in the Balkans. Satisfactorily applied the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should notintervene in the Balkans. Thoroughly applied the argument mapping procedures presented in Chapter 8 to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendations that the U.S. should notintervene in the Balkans.
5. Write a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily. Weight: 20% Did not submit or incompletely wrote a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily. Partially wrote a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily. Satisfactorily wrote a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily. Thoroughly wrote a one (1) page analysis that uses critical thinking to assess the overall plausibility of the claim: The conflict in Bosnia is somebody else s trouble. The U.S. should not intervene militarily.
6. Complete an argument map to illustrate your analysis. Weight: 10% Did not submit or incompletely completed an argument map to illustrate your analysis. Partially completed an argument map to illustrate your analysis. Satisfactorily completed an argument map to illustrate your analysis. Thoroughly completed an argument map to illustrate your analysis.
7. 2 references Weight: 5% Does not meet the required number of references. Meets the required number of references; some or all references poor quality choices. Meets number of required references; most references quality choices. Exceeds number of required references; all references high quality choices.
8. Clarity, writing mechanics, and formatting requirements Weight: 10% More than 6 errors present 5-6 errors present 3-4 errors present

Essay – Benefiting The Public Good

Read/review the following resources for this activity:

  • Textbook: Chapter 1, 2
  • Lesson
  • Minimum of 1 scholarly source

Instructions
One role of government is to ensure that policies benefit the people within their jurisdiction.

  • For local governments, it would be the townspeople or city dwellers.
  • For the state governments, it would be the people living within the state.
  • For the federal government, it would be everyone within the borders of the country.

Using an ideology discussed in the textbook, construct an argument explaining how this ideology upholds the public good by examining power, order, and justice.

Select an ideology discussed in the textbook. In an essay, examine how power, order, and justice as it relates to the ideology you choose promotes the public good.

Writing Requirements (APA format)

  • Length: 1.5-2 pages (not including title page or references page)
  • 1-inch margins
  • Double spaced
  • 12-point Times New Roman font
  • Title page
  • References page (minimum of 1 scholarly source and textbook/lesson)agstadt, T. M. (2017). Understanding politics: Ideas, institutions, and issues. Australia: Cengage Learning.

     

    Chapter 1. Introduction: The Study of Politics

    Learning Objectives

    · 1Discuss the value of studying politics.

    · 2Identify the three basic elements of politics, as well as the dynamics of each.

    · 3Analyze the methods, models, and approaches for studying politics.

    · 4Evaluate whether politics brings out the best or the worst in human nature—or both.

    Politics is not for the faint-hearted. There is virtually never a day without a crisis at home or abroad. Whenever we catch the news on our radio, TV, or computer, we are reminded that we live in a dangerous world.

    In 2008, the spectacle of the world’s only superpower paralyzed by extreme partisanship and teetering on the brink of a “fiscal cliff” loomed like a gathering storm. No sooner had that danger receded than a new threat arose in the Middle East in the form of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). There were even rumors of a coming end-of-the-world apocalypse—December 21, 2012, to be exact, the final day of the old Mayan calendar.

    The politically charged atmosphere and the pervasive sense of an impending crisis was nothing new, but two events dominated the news in 2008. First, a financial meltdown and plummeting stock market wiped out fortunes and rocked the global economy to its very foundations. Second, Barack Obama became the first African American elected to the nation’s highest office.

    Political culture plays a big role in shaping public policy, and optimism is part of America’s political DNA. Despite a deepening recession, there was a new sense of hope—perhaps it was the beginning of the end of two costly wars and the dawn of a new era in America. But by 2012 hope had given way to anger and disappointment.

    What happened? In 2009, President Obama had moved to revive the U.S. economy, which had fallen into the deepest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. But the economic stimulus package he pushed through Congress, where the Democrats enjoyed a solid majority in both the House and Senate, was widely viewed as a Wall Street “bailout”—a massive multibillion dollar gift to the very financial institutions that had caused the problem. It was also criticized as a “jobless recovery”; unemployment rose to nearly 10% and youth unemployment (16- to 19-year-olds) rose about 25% in 2010. Nearly half of young people aged 16 to 24 did not have jobs, the highest number since World War II.

    The conservative media (most notably FOX News) and the amorphous Tea Party movement eagerly exploited growing public discontent, handing the Democrats a crushing defeat in the 2010 midterm elections. Republicans regained control of the House and cut deeply into the Democrats’ majority in the Senate (see especially Chapters 11 and 13).

    Obama also spearheaded a controversial health care reform that satisfied few, confused everyone, and angered many voters on both sides of the acrimonious debate. His decision to order a “surge” in Afghanistan, committing 30,000 more U.S. troops to an unpopular and unwinnable war, did not placate Congress or greatly improve his standing in the opinion polls, nor did his decision to withdraw the last U.S. combat troops from Iraq in December 2011.

    Despite a constant chorus of criticism and a vicious media campaign of attack ads from the right, Obama was elected to a second term in 2012. He defeated Republican Mitt Romney by a margin of 5 million votes (51% to 47% of the popular vote) while taking 61% of the electoral votes. The embattled president’s troubles in dealing with a recalcitrant Republican majority in Congress, however, continued unabated. His decision in the fall of 2014 to launch a major bombing campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria—in effect, resuming a war that had officially ended three years earlier—did not appease the opposition or boost his popularity, which fell to new lows in 2014.

    The president’s popularity—or lack thereof—was a major factor in setting the stage for the Republican victory in the 2014 midterm elections when voters gave the GOP a majority in the Senate. Republicans also gained seats in the House (where they had won back control in 2010). But President Obama acted decisively in the days following the election, confounding his critics and commentators who had branded him a “lame duck.”

    We know politics is something that happens in Washington, D.C., or in Austin, Texas, and other state capitals, but some of us forget that politics is a pervasive fact of life— others never forget it. That very fact often gives those “others” a big advantage, which can be the difference between success and failure.

    For any democracy to succeed in the long run, it is vital that citizens pay attention, learn to think for themselves, and vote intelligently. Political literacy is vital to a viable and sustainable representative government—what we commonly call “democracy.”

    The alternative is revolution, a drastic measure and a last resort—one American colonists chose in 1776 and the Confederate South chose in 1860. As we will see in Chapter 14, revolutions are convulsive and quixotic. They often result in less freedom for the people, not more.

    A popular slogan (and bumper sticker) reminds us that “Freedom Isn’t Free.” It’s true. At a minimum, being a good citizen requires us to have a basic understanding of the ideas, institutions, and issues that constitute the stuff of politics. This book is an attempt to foster just such an understanding.

    Why Study Politics?

    The belief that anybody with a college education will have a basic understanding of political ideas, institutions, and issues is wishful thinking. There is a mountain of evidence showing it’s simply not true; moreover, there is a mountain of empirical evidence to prove it. To begin to understand the power of politics—and the politics of power—we have to make a careful study and, above all, keep an open mind.

    Self-Interest

    Because personal happiness depends in no small degree on what government does or does not do, we all have a considerable stake in understanding how government works (or why it is not working). Federal work-study programs, state subsidies to public education, low-interest loans, federal grants, and court decisions that protect students’ rights are but a few examples of politics and public policy that directly affect college students. For farmers, crop subsidies, price supports, and water rights are crucial policy issues. Environmental regulations are often the target of intense lobbying on the part of power companies, the oil and gas industry, and mining interests.

    Taxes are a hot button for nearly everybody. Most people think they pay too much and others pay too little. Do you know anybody who wants to pay more in taxes? Can you think of one wealthy individual who argues that people in his income bracket ought to pay more? (Hint: His initials are W.B.)

    Through the study of politics, we become more aware of our dependence on the political system and better equipped to determine when to favor and when to oppose change. At the same time, such study helps to reveal the limits of politics and the obstacles to bringing about any major change in a society. It is sobering to consider that each of us is only one person in a nation of millions (and a world of billions), most of whom have opinions and prejudices no less firmly held than our own.

    The Public Interest

    What could be more vital to the public interest in any society than the moral character and conduct of its citizens? Civil society is defined by and reflected in the kinds of everyday decisions and choices made by ordinary people leading ordinary lives. At the same time, people are greatly influenced by civil society and the prevailing culture and climate of politics. We are all products of our circumstances to a greater extent than most of us realize (or care to admit). Politics plays a vital role in shaping these circumstances, and it is fair to say the public interest hangs in the balance.

    Basic Concepts of Politics

    Politics has been defined as “the art of the possible,” as the study of “who gets what, when, and how,” as the “authoritative allocation of values,” and in various other ways. Many people think politics is inherently corrupt and corrupting—hence the term “dirty politics.” Is this true? Can you think of any exceptions?

    We may not agree on how to define politics, but we know what it is when we see it—and we don’t like what we see. We are quick to blame “politics” as the main cause of problems not only in society but also in families, schools, and the workplace. Likewise, college students are typically unaware of the anger and tumult that often animate campus politics.

    Like other disciplines, political science has a lexicon and language all its own. We start our language lesson with three words that carry a great deal of political freight: power, order, and justice.

    Power

    Power is the currency of all politics. Without power, no government can make and enforce laws, provide security, regulate the economy, conduct foreign policy, or wage war. There are many kinds of power. In this book, we are interested in political power. Coercion plays an important role in politics, but political power cannot be equated with force. Indeed, the sources of power are many and varied. A large population, a booming economy, a cohesive society, and wise leadership—all are examples of quite different power sources.

    We often define power in terms of national wealth or military spending. We once called the most formidable states Great Powers; now we call them “superpowers.” Power defined in this way is tangible and measurable. Critics of this classical view make a useful distinction between “hard power” and “soft power.” Hard power refers to the means and instruments of brute force or coercion, primarily military and economic clout. Soft power is “attractive” rather than coercive: the essence of soft power is “the important ability to get others to want what you want.”*

    Power is never equally distributed. Yet the need to concentrate power in the hands of a few inevitably raises three big questions: Who wields power? In whose interests? And to what ends?

    The most basic question of all is “Who rules?” Sometimes we have only to look at a nation’s constitution and observe the workings of its government to find the answer. But it may be difficult to determine who really rules when the government is cloaked in secrecy or when, as is often the case, informal patterns of power are very different from the textbook diagrams.

    The terms power and authority are often confused and even used interchangeably. In reality, they denote two distinct dimensions of politics. According to Mao Zedong, the late Chinese Communist leader, “Political power flows from the barrel of a gun.” Political power is clearly associated with the means of coercion (the regular police, secret police, and the army), but power can also flow from wealth, personal charisma, ideology, religion, and many other sources, including the moral standing of a particular individual or group in society.

    Authority, by definition, flows not only (or even mainly) from the barrel of a gun but also from the norms society accepts and even cherishes. These norms are moral, spiritual, and legal codes of behavior, or good conduct. Thus, authority implies legitimacy—a condition in which power is exercised by common consensus through established institutions. Note this definition does not mean, nor is it meant to imply, that democracy is the only legitimate form of government possible. Any government that enjoys the consent of the governed is legitimate—including a monarchy, military dictatorship, or theocracy.

    The acid test of legitimate authority is not whether people have the right to vote or to strike or dissent openly, but how much value people attach to these rights. If a majority of the people are content with the existing political order just as it is (with or without voting rights), the legitimacy of the ruler(s) is simply not in question. But, as history amply demonstrates, it is possible to seize power and to rule without a popular mandate or public approval, without moral, spiritual, or legal justification—in other words, without true (legitimate) authority.

    A military power seizure—also known as a coup d’etat—typically involves a plot by senior army officers to overthrow a corrupt, incompetent, or unpopular civilian ruler. One well-known recent example happened in Egypt in July 2013, following many months of turmoil and the outcome of a presidential election that became unacceptable to the military.

    Power seizures also occurred in Mauritania and Guinea in 2008 and in Thailand as recently as 2014; many contemporary rulers, especially in Africa, have come to power in this manner. Adolf Hitler’s failed “Beer Hall Putsch” in 1923 is a famous example of an attempted power seizure. Such attempts often fail, but they are usually evidence of political instability—as the case of Weimar Germany illustrates.

    Claiming authority is useless without the means to enforce it. The right to rule—a condition that minimizes the need for repression—hinges in large part on legitimacy or popularity.

    Legitimacy and popularity go hand in hand. Illegitimate rulers are unpopular rulers. Such rulers are faced with a choice: relinquish power or repress opposition. Whether repression works depends, in turn, on the answer to three questions. First, how widespread and determined is the opposition? Second, does the government have adequate financial resources and coercive capabilities to defeat its opponents and deter future challenges? Third, does the government have the will to use all means necessary to defeat the rebellion?

    If the opposition is broadly based and the government waivers for whatever reason, repression is likely to fail. Regimes changed in Russia in 1917 and 1992 following failed attempts to crush the opposition. Two other examples include Cuba in 1958, where Fidel Castro led a successful revolution, and Iran in 1978, where a mass uprising led to the overthrow of the Shah. A similar pattern was evident in many East European states in 1989, when repressive communist regimes collapsed like so many falling dominoes.

    If people respect the ruler(s) and play by the rules without being forced to do so (or threatened with the consequences), the task of maintaining order and stability in society is going to be much easier. It stands to reason that people who feel exploited and oppressed make poorly motivated workers. The perverse work ethic of Soviet-style dictatorships, where it was frequently said, “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us,” helps explain the decline and fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, dramatized by the spontaneous tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

    Order

    Order exists on several levels. First, it denotes structures, rules, rituals, procedures, and practices that make up the political system embedded in every society. What exactly is society? In essence, society is an aggregation of individuals who share a common identity. Usually that identity is at least partially defined by geography, because people who live in close proximity often know each other, enjoy shared experiences, speak the same language, and have similar values and interests. The process of instilling a sense of common purpose or creating a single political allegiance among diverse groups of people is complex and works better from the bottom up than from the top down. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, after more than seven decades as multinational states, suggests new communities are often fragile and tend to fall apart quickly if there are not strong cultural and psychological bonds under the political structures.

    The Russian-backed secessionist movement that threatened to break up Ukraine in 2014-15 also illustrates the obstacles to maintaining order in a newly independent country where a national minority group is geographically concentrated. Russian-speakers in parts of eastern Ukraine bordering on Russia constitute a solid majority and remain fiercely loyal to Moscow. The same is true in Crimea (previously part of Ukraine), where most people welcomed Russia’s armed intervention. Russia annexed this strategically important region (the whole of the Crimean Peninsula) in March of 2014.

    The idea that individuals become a cohesive community through an unwritten social contract has been fundamental to Western political thought since the seventeenth century. Basic to social contract theory is the notion that the right to rule is based on the consent of the governed. Civil liberties in this type of community are a matter of natural law and natural rights—that is, they do not depend on written laws but rather are inherent in Nature. Nature with a capital N is a set of self-evident truths that, in the eyes of social contract theorists, can be known through a combination of reason and observation. A corollary of this theory is that whenever government turns oppressive, when it arbitrarily takes away such natural rights as life, liberty, and (perhaps) property, the people have a right to revolt (see Chapter 14).

    Government is a human invention by which societies are ruled and binding rules are made. Given the rich variety of governments in the world, how might we categorize them all? Traditionally we’ve distinguished between republics, in which sovereignty (see below) ultimately resides in the people, and governments such as monarchies or tyrannies, in which sovereignty rests with the rulers. Today, almost all republics are democratic (or representative) republics, meaning political systems wherein elected representatives responsible to the people exercise sovereign power.*

    Some political scientists draw a simple distinction between democracies, which hold free elections, and dictatorships, which do not. Others emphasize political economy, distinguishing between governments enmeshed in capitalist or market-based systems and governments based on socialist or state-regulated systems. Finally, governments in developing countries face different kinds of challenges than do governments in developed countries. Not surprisingly, more economically developed countries often have markedly more well-established political institutions—including political parties, regular elections, civil and criminal courts—than most less developed countries, and more stable political systems.

    In the modern world, the state is the sole repository of sovereignty. A sovereign state is a community with well-defined territorial boundaries administered by a single government capable of making and enforcing laws. In addition, it typically claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; raises armies for the defense of its territory and population; levies and collects taxes; regulates trade and commerce; establishes courts, judges, and magistrates to settle disputes and punish lawbreakers; and sends envoys (ambassadors) to represent its interests abroad, negotiate treaties, and gather useful information. Entities that share some but not all of the characteristics of states include fiefdoms and chiefdoms, bands and tribes, universal international organizations (such as the United Nations), and regional supranational organizations (such as the European Union).

    In the language of politics, state usually means country. France, for instance, may be called either a state or a country. (In certain federal systems of government, a state is an administrative subdivision, such as New York, Florida, Texas, or California in the United States; however, such states within a state are not sovereign.)

    The term nation is also a synonym for state or country. Thus, the only way to know for certain whether state means part of a country (for example, the United States) or a whole country (say, France or China) is to consider the context. By the same token, context is the key to understanding what we mean by the word nation.

    nation is made up of a distinct group of people who share a common background, including geographic location, history, racial or ethnic characteristics, religion, language, culture, or belief in common political ideas. Geography heads this list because members of a nation typically exhibit a strong collective sense of belonging associated with a particular territory for which they are willing to fight and die if necessary.

    Countries with relatively homogeneous populations (with great similarity among members) were most common in old Europe, but this once-defining characteristic of European nation-states is no longer true. The recent influx of newcomers from former colonial areas, in particular the Muslim majority countries of North Africa, the Arab world, and South Asia, and post–Cold War east-west population movements in Europe have brought the issue of immigration to the forefront of politics in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and even the Scandinavian countries. Belgium, on the other hand, provides a rare example of a European state divided culturally and linguistically (French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-speaking Flemish) from the start.

    India, Russia, and Nigeria are three highly diverse states. India’s constitution officially recognizes no fewer than eighteen native tongues! The actual number spoken is far larger. As a nation of immigrants, the United States is also very diverse, but the process of assimilation eventually brings the children of newcomers, if not the newcomers themselves, into the mainstream.*

    The nation-state is a state encompassing a single nation in which the overwhelming majority of the people form a dominant in-group who share common cultural, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics; all others are part of a distinct out-group or minority. This concept is rooted in a specific time and place—that is, in modern Western Europe. (See “Landmarks in History” for the story of the first nation-state.) The concept of the nation-state fits less comfortably in other regions of the world, where the political boundaries of sovereign states—many of which were European colonies before World War II—often do not coincide with ethnic or cultural geography. In some instances, ethnic, religious, or tribal groups that were bitter traditional enemies were thrown together in new “states,” resulting in societies prone to great instability or even civil war.

    Decolonization after World War II gave rise to many polyglot states in which various ethnic or tribal groups were not assimilated into the new social order. Many decades later, the all-important task of nation-building in these new states is still far from finished. Thus, in 1967, Nigeria plunged into a vicious civil war when one large ethnic group, the Igbo, tried unsuccessfully to secede and form an independent state called Biafra. In 1994, Rwanda witnessed one of the bloodiest massacres in modern times when the numerically superior Hutus slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Tutsis, including women and children. In early 2008, tribal violence in Kenya’s Rift Valley and beyond claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent people following the outcome of a presidential election that many believed was rigged.

    In India, where Hindus and Muslims frequently clash and sporadic violence breaks out among militant Sikhs in Punjab and where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken, characterizing the country as a nation-state misses the point altogether. In Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), Hindu Tamils have long waged a terrorist guerrilla war against the majority Singhalese, who are Buddhist.

    Even in the Slavic-speaking parts of Europe, age-old ethnic rivalries have caused the breakup of preexisting states. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are multinational states that self-destructed in the 1990s—in 2014-15 centrifugal tendencies threatened to split Ukraine in half.

    Landmarks in History The Peace of Westphalia (1648): The Origins of the Modern Nation-State System

    Most historians believe the Peace of Westphalia marks the beginning of the modern European state system. The main actors in forging the peace, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, were Sweden and France as the challengers, Spain and the dying Holy Roman Empire as the defenders of the status quo, and the newly independent Netherlands.

    At first glance, the map of Europe in the mid-seventeenth century does not look much like it does today. However, on closer inspection, we see the outlines of modern Europe emerge (see Figure 1.1)—visual proof that the treaty laid the foundations of the nation-state as we see it in Europe today.

    The emergence of the nation-state system transformed Europe from a continent of territorial empires to one based on relatively compact geographic units that share a single dominant language and culture. This pattern was unprecedented and it would shape both European and world history in the centuries to come.

    France under Napoleon attempted to establish a new continental empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century but ultimately failed. Two other empires—Austria-Hungary and Russia—remained, but they were eclipsed by a rising new nation-state at the end of the nineteenth century and perished in World War I. After World War I, only the newly constituted Soviet empire existed in Europe. After World War II, what remained of Europe’s overseas colonial empires also disintegrated. Today, the entire world, with few exceptions, is carved up into nation-states—the legacy of a treaty that, for better or worse, set the stage for a new world order.

    Finally, stateless nations such as the Palestinians, Kurds, and Native Americans (known as First Nations in Canada) share a sense of common identity but no longer control the homelands or territories they once inhabited. The tragic reality of nations without states has created highly volatile situations, most notably in the Middle East.

    Justice

    We willingly accept the rule of the few over the many only if the public interest—or common good—is significantly advanced in the process. The concept of justice is no less fundamental than power in politics, and it is essential to a stable order. Is power exercised fairly, in the interest of the ruled, or merely for the sake of the rulers? For more than two thousand years, political observers have maintained the distinction between the public-spirited exercise of political power on one hand and self-interested rule on the other. This distinction attests to the importance of justice in political life.

    Not all states and regimes allow questions of justice to be raised; in fact, throughout history, most have not. Even today, some governments brutally and systematically repress political dissent because they fear the consequences.

    Often, criticism of how a government rules implicitly or explicitly raises questions about its moral or legal right to rule. One of the most important measures of liberty is the right to question whether the government is acting justly.

    Questions about whether a particular ruler is legitimate or a given policy is desirable stem from human nature itself. The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE) observed that human beings alone use reason and language “to declare what is advantageous and what is just and unjust.” Therefore, “it is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with the rest of the animal world, that he alone possess a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust.”*

    The same human faculties that make moral judgment possible also make political literacy—the ability to think and speak intelligently about politics—necessary. In other words, moral judgment and political literacy are two sides of the same coin.

    The Problem of Dirty Hands

    Based on everyday observation, it’s easy to get the impression that politics and morality operate in separate realms of human experience, that power always corrupts, and that anyone who thinks differently is hopelessly naïve. Political theorists have long recognized and debated whether it is possible to exercise power and still remain true to one’s principles. It’s called the problem of “dirty hands.”

    In politics, anything is possible, including the unthinkable. When morality is set aside, justice is placed entirely at the mercy of raw power.

    The rise and fall of Nazi Germany (1933–1945) under Adolf Hitler illustrates the tremendous impact a regime can have on the moral character of its citizens. At the core of Nazi ideology was a doctrine of racial supremacy. Hitler ranted about the superiority of the so-called Aryan race. The purity of the German nation was supposedly threatened with adulteration by inferior races, or untermenschen. Policies based on this maniacal worldview resulted in the systematic murder of millions of innocent men, women, and children. Approximately six million Jews and millions of others, including Poles, Gypsies, homosexuals, and people with disabilities, were killed in cold blood.

    During the Nazi era, the German nation appears, at first glance, to have become little more than an extension of Hitler’s will—in other words, the awesome moral responsibility for the Holocaust somehow rested on the shoulders of one man, Adolf Hitler. But some dispute this interpretation. For example, according to Irving Kristol,

    When one studies the case of The Nazi there comes a sickening emptiness of the stomach and a sense of bafflement. Can this be all? The disparity between the crime and the criminal is too monstrous.

    We expect to find evil men, paragons of wickedness, slobbering, maniacal brutes; we are prepared to trace the lineaments of The Nazi on the face of every individual Nazi in order to define triumphantly the essential features of his character. But the Nazi leaders were not diabolists, they did not worship evil. For—greatest of ironies—the Nazis, like Adam and Eve before the fall, knew not of good and evil, and it is this cast of moral indifference that makes them appear so petty and colorless and superficial.*

    One such person, according to the late German-born political theorist Hannah Arendt, was Otto Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi officer in charge of Jewish affairs in the Third Reich, who engineered and directed the genocide or extermination program known in history as the Holocaust. In Arendt’s view, Eichmann was not a particularly unusual man.*

    Following Eichmann’s capture in 1960 and his subsequent trial for war crimes, Arendt wrote a famous series of articles for The New Yorker later published in a book entitled Eichmann in Jerusalem: The Banality of Evil. The subtitle of the book underscored Arendt’s central argument: namely, that far from being one of the masterminds of the Holocaust, Eichmann was an ordinary man with no original ideas, great ambitions, or deep convictions. Rather, he had a strong desire to get ahead, to be a success in life. He took special pride in his ability to do a job efficiently.

    Politics and Pop Culture Schindler’s List

    Not all Germans, or Europeans, were as indifferent or self-serving in the face of evil as Adolf Eichmann. One notable example was Oskar Schindler, who is now widely renowned thanks largely to the movie Schindler’s List.

    Schindler was a German businessman who belonged to the Nazi Party. Schindler was no saint, but he used his business and political connections to save the lives of the Jewish workers he had first exploited.*

    No doubt most of us would identify more with Schindler and other Christians who rescued Jews than with Eichmann, but the disturbing fact remains that far more Germans (including tens of thousands of Hitler Youth), mesmerized by Hitler’s message of hate, behaved more like Eichmann than like Schindler.

    At his trial for war crimes, Eichmann claimed to have no obsessive hatred toward Jews. In fact, we know now that Eichmann’s “little man” self-portrait was a clever act designed to save him from the gallows.

    Although Eichmann was not the mere functionary or “cog” he claimed to be, many Germans who participated directly in the Holocaust do fit this description—they were following orders, full stop. The fact that so many Germans blindly obeyed Eichmann and Hitler’s other top lieutenants illustrates the fine line between indifference and immorality—and how easily the former can lead to the latter.

    · Eichmann exemplifies the worst in human nature; Schindler exemplifies the best. Both men were caught up in the same set of circumstances. Except for a depraved but ingenious demagogue name Hitler, Eichmann would not have become a war criminal and Schindler would not have become a paragon. If Hitler does not deserve the credit for producing an exemplar like Schindler, does he deserve the blame for producing a monster like Eichmann? Think about it.

    Hint: If we are all products of the circumstances we are born (or thrust) into, we are thereby absolved of individual moral responsibility. On the other hand, if there is such a thing as free will, then we cannot blame society for our misdeeds.

    Although not particularly thoughtful or reflective in Arendt’s view, he was intelligent in practical ways, attentive to details, a competent administrator capable of managing a major operation like the systematic mass murder of millions of Jews and other “enemies” and “degenerates.” Arendt also describes Eichmann as somewhat insecure, but not noticeably more so than many “normal” people (see “Politics and Pop Culture”).

     

    More recently, scholars have unearthed a treasure trove of research materials that challenge Arendt’s thesis. In a well-documented 579-page tome entitled Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), German philosopher Bettina Stangneth shows clearly that Eichmann was a thinking man, a fanatical believer in German racial superiority who believed himself to have been involved in “creative” work and who—as a fugitive hiding out in Argentina after the war—was determined to secure his rightful place as a hero in German history. The notion that in Kristol’s words “he knew not of good and evil” is no longer credible. Eichmann did not lose any sleep over dirty hands; instead, he gloried in having bloody hands.

    How to Study Politics

    Aristotle is the father of political science.* He not only wrote about politics and ethics, but he also described different political systems and suggested a scheme for classifying and evaluating them. For Aristotle, political science simply meant political investigation; thus, a political scientist was one who sought, through systematic inquiry, to understand the truth about politics. In this sense, Aristotle’s approach to studying politics more than two thousand years ago has much in common with what political scientists do today. Yet the discipline has changed a great deal since Aristotle’s time.

    There is no consensus on how best to study politics. Political scientists can and do choose among different approaches, ask different kinds of questions, and address different audiences. This fact is often a source of some dismay within the discipline, but it is hardly surprising and probably unavoidable given the vast universe of human activity the study of politics encompasses. Let us explore why and how contemporary political scientists study politics.

    For What Purposes?

    Some of the most important questions in politics are “should” and “ought” questions, the kind that scientists seeking objective truth tend to avoid. These are the great normative political questions that resonate throughout human history: When is war justified? Do people have a right to revolt? Is the right to life absolute? Is state repression always wrong? Does government have a right to keep secrets from the people? To invade the privacy of its citizens? What about censorship? Is government ever justified in placing limits on freedom of expression and freedom of the press? Should every citizen pay taxes at the same rate? If not, why not? Who should pay more and who less?

    Such questions may seem too abstract or theoretical to have any practical value, but in fact they are behind the most controversial political issues of the day—abortion, gun control, gay rights, legalization of marijuana, capital punishment, and the list goes on. (See if you can think of more issues to add to this list and connect each issue to some fundamental question of justice or fairness.)

    Some issues lend themselves to empirical analysis more than others. Studying elections, for example, can reveal flaws in the voting process—such as skewed voting districts or impediments to voter registration—and lead to appropriate changes or reforms, such as redistricting or switching from written ballots to voting machines. Opinion polls help leaders gauge the mood of the public and better understand the effect of government policies (see Chapter 11).

    However, answers to many of the most basic questions in politics can only be discovered via a thorough knowledge of the facts and a rigorous process of analysis involving reason, logic, and dialogue. There are no shortcuts, and given that we are talking about the health and well-being of society, the stakes are too high to settle for anything less than our best efforts.

    By What Methods?

    Should political science strive to predict or forecast events? Is the study of politics a science akin to physics or chemistry? Answers to such questions lie in the realm of methodology. There are many ways to classify political scientists. We will focus on one basic distinction—the difference between positivism and normativism.

    Positivism emphasizes empirical research (which relies on observation) and couches problems in terms of variables we can measure. Behaviorism is an offshoot of positivism that focuses mainly on the study of political behavior. Behaviorists use quantitative analysis to challenge the conventional wisdom—for example, what motivates voters or why a given election turned out the way it did. Following the facts—statistical data—wherever they may lead is the hallmark of the so-called hard sciences. The results of empirical research can cast long-standing “truths” into serious doubt or expose “facts” as fallacies.

    Normativism is based on the idea closely associated with the German political philosopher Immanuel Kant. He stated that the “ought” and the “is” are inseparable from one another and that the “ought” cannot be derived from the “is.” Sticking strictly to the facts, a trademark of positivism, thus raises a serious problem for the adherents of normative theory, who are interested not only in describing actions and consequences but also in prescribing policies and remedies. Seen in this light, values are at the core of political analysis. In studying Congress, for example, value-based political science might ask: Did special interests unduly influence health care reform in 2009-2010? Or with respect to U.S. foreign policy: Was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 necessary?

    Scholars and policy analysts seeking answers to such questions often resort to philosophy, history, constitutional law, court cases, treaties, declassified documents, and expert opinion. For example, in explaining why the Constitution adopted in 1787 did not abolish slavery, scholars often skip over the question of whether or why slavery is wrong. Instead, they examine the writings and speeches of the founding fathers, the economic interests they represented, the social class to which they all belonged, and the like. The reason they (we) don’t dwell on the moral question is that today every sane and sensible person knows slavery is wrong. Slavery is an extreme case, but many political issues are at least as much about values as about facts.

    In truth, it is not always easy to distinguish between a fact and a value. Moreover, in politics, values are facts. We all bring certain values to everything we do. At the same time, however, we can never get at the truth if we don’t place a high value on facts.

    For example, the belief that abortion is a sin, which is held by an influential segment of the population, is a value based on a religious belief or moral conviction. We can argue all day long whether abortion is an American’s right or always wrong, but there is no escaping the fact that it is controversial and that politicians, government officials, and judges have no choice but to deal with it. No matter what legislation or jurisprudence is brought to bear on this question, it will have far-reaching consequences for society. This is but one simple example among many, illustrating the reality in which facts and values are entangled in the political life of every society, always have been, and always will be.

    The Study of Human Behavior

    Political scientists tend to be wary of “subjective” value judgments that often fly in the face of objective facts. In the social sciences, so-called behaviorists use the type of quantitative methods common in the natural sciences such as biology, physics, and chemistry, asking questions that can only be answered empirically. Constructing a research design, collecting data, using the objective tools of statistical analysis to test hypotheses—these are the essential elements of the scientific method. In this manner, behavioral scientists develop mathematical models to try and explain voting behavior, coalition-building, decision making, even the causes of war.

    In a study done nearly two decades ago but still relevant, researchers asked: Is it really true, as is widely believed, that high voter turnout favors Democrats?* The prevailing belief that Democrats benefit from high voter turnout assumes several things:

    · (1)

    people with lower socioeconomic status (SES) vote less often than people with higher SES;

    · (2)

    as voter turnout rises, more people on the lower end of the SES ladder vote; and

    · (3)

    lower-end voters are likely to vote for the party they trust to advance working-class interests—namely, the Democratic Party.

    This belief is reinforced whenever low voter turnout coincides with Republican victories. It also explains why most Democrats favored (and Republicans opposed) the 1993 National Voter Registration Act—popularly known as the Motor Voter Bill—which eased voter registration procedures.

    Researchers examined 1,842 state elections going all the way back to 1928: 983 for senator and 859 for governor. Applying a mathematical test, they concluded that from 1928 to 1964 high voter turnout did aid the Democrats, as generally believed, but after 1964 there was no such correlation either in senatorial or gubernatorial races.

    Why? Although this question was beyond the scope of the study, its findings were consistent with another complex theory of voting behavior. The rise in the number of independents since 1964 (and the resulting decline in party identification and partisan voting) made it difficult to calculate which party would benefit from a large voter turnout in any given race. In 2011, a Gallup poll found that 40% of all voters identified themselves as independents, and ticket splitting and swing voting have become common (see Chapter 11). In the 2010 midterm elections, for example, Republicans were the beneficiaries of a huge swing vote, as they were once again in 2014.

    Behaviorists, like other research scientists, are typically content to take small steps on the road to knowledge. Each step points the way to future studies.

    Studying human behavior can be as frustrating as it is fascinating. There are almost always multiple explanations for human behavior, and it is often difficult to isolate a single cause or distinguish it from a mere statistical correlation. For instance, several studies indicate that criminals tend to be less intelligent than law-abiding citizens. But is low intelligence a cause of crime? What about social factors such as poverty, drug or alcohol addiction, or a history of being abused as a child? What about free will? Many reject the idea that society—rather than the criminal—is somehow responsible for the crime.

    Political scientists often disagree not only about how to study politics but also about which questions to ask. Behaviorists typically prefer to examine specific and narrowly defined questions, answering them by applying quantitative techniques—sophisticated statistical methods such as regression analysis and analysis of variance.

    Many broader questions of politics, especially those raising issues of justice, lie beyond the scope of this sort of investigation. Questions such as “What is justice?” or “What is the role of the state in society?” require us to make moral choices and value judgments. Even if we cannot resolve such questions scientifically, they are worth asking. Confining the study of politics only to the kinds of questions we can subject to quantitative analysis risks turning political science into an academic game of Trivial Pursuit.

    Given the complexity of human behavior, it is not surprising that experts argue over methodology, or how to do science. Although the lively debate sparked by the behavioral revolution has cooled, it divided the discipline for several decades and is likely to continue to do so for years to come.

    The Political (Science) Puzzle

    Political science, like politics, means different things to different people. The subject matter of politics is wide-ranging and thus difficult to study without breaking it down into more manageable parts and pieces. Subfields include political theory, U.S. government and politics, public administration, public policy, political economy, comparative politics, and international relations.

    Political Theory

    The origins of what we now call political science are to be found in Greek philosophy and date back to Socrates and Plato (circa 400 BCE). The Socratic method of teaching and seeking Truth was to ask a series of pithy questions—What is the good life? Is there a natural right to liberty?—while questioning every answer in order to expose logical fallacies.

    Political theory seeks answers to such questions through reason, logic, and experience. Famous names in the history of political thought include Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill, among others. These thinkers ranged far and wide but met at the intersection of politics and ethics.

    Because people on opposite sides of the political fence believe that they are right and the other people are wrong, understanding politics requires us, at minimum, to be open-minded and familiarize ourselves with pro and con arguments.* Knowledge of costs and the moral consequences in politics are essential to a clear sense of purpose and coherent policy.

    Are we humans rational by nature or are we driven by passions such as love, hate, anger, and prejudice? Advocates of rational choice theory emphasize the role of reason over emotion in human behavior. Political behavior, arguably, follows logical and even predictable patterns. The key to understanding politics is self-interest. This approach, which forms the basis for a theory of international relations known as political realism (see Chapter 17), holds that individuals and states alike act according to the iron logic of self-interest.

    Other political scientists argue that rational choice theory is an oversimplification because states and groups are composed of human beings with disparate interests, perceptions, and beliefs. The key is not self-interest pure and simple but culture and shared values. In this view, we cannot explain political behavior by reference to logic and rationality alone. Instead, the behavior of individuals and of groups is a product of specific influences that vary from place to place—in other words, political behavior is a product of political culture.

    Of course, it is not necessary to adhere dogmatically to one theory or the other. Both contain important insights and we can perhaps best see them as complementary rather than conflicting.

    U.S. Government and Politics

    Understanding our own political institutions is vitally important. Because the United States is a federal system, our frame of reference changes depending on whether we mean national, state, or local politics. Similarly, when we study political behavior in the United States, it makes a big difference whether we are focusing on individual behavior or the behavior of groups such as interest groups, ethnic groups, age cohorts, and the like. Teaching and learning about one’s own government is, in effect, an exercise in civic education.

    Citizens in a democracy need to know how the government works, what rights they are guaranteed by the Constitution, and how to decide what to believe. We need to remember that the United States is home to the oldest written constitution, a behemoth economy, and the most potent military capability of all time. Prestige, power, and wealth have political and moral consequences: namely, an obligation to act responsibly as citizens of both a powerful country and an interdependent world.

    Public Administration

    Public administration is all about how governments organize and operate, about how bureaucracies work and interact with citizens and each other. In federal systems, intergovernmental relations is a major focus of study. Students of public administration examine budgets, procedures, and processes in an attempt to improve efficiency and reduce waste and duplication. One perennial question deals with bureaucratic behavior: How and why do bureaucracies develop vested interests and special relationships (such as between the Pentagon and defense contractors, or the Department of Commerce and trade associations) quite apart from the laws and policies they are established to implement?

    Political scientists who study public administration frequently concentrate on case studies, paying attention to whether governmental power is exercised in a manner consistent with the public interest. Public administration shares this focus with policy studies and political science as a whole.

    Policy Studies and Analysis

    Public policy places a heavy emphasis on the outputs of government. However, the politics of public policy involves inputs as well. Before any policy can be formulated and finalized, much less implemented, all sorts of ideas and interests must be brought forward, congressional hearings held, consultants hired, and studies undertaken, published, digested, and debated. Not only special interests but also institutional interests and bureaucratic politics are further complicating factors. Once a policy is put into effect, policy analysts study the effects and look for signs—evidence—that it’s working or not working. The whole process is highly political both because public policy carries a price tag denominated in taxpayer dollars and, not least, because it often carries a lot ideological freight.

    Political Economy

    The study of political economy is a particularly well-developed discipline in the United Kingdom, but it has migrated across the Atlantic and now occupies a prominent place in the curriculum at many colleges and universities in the United States. As the name implies, this subfield resides at the intersection of politics and economics. The genius of this marriage of two disciplines arises from the fact that so much of what governments do involves monetary and fiscal policy (taxes and spending), which have a major impact on the distribution of wealth in society, inflation and interest rates, employment levels, the business cycle, the investment climate, bank regulations, and the like.

    Comparative Politics

    Comparative politics seeks to contrast and evaluate governments and political systems. Comparing forms of government, stages of economic development, domestic and foreign policies, and political traditions enables political scientists to formulate meaningful generalizations. Some comparativists specialize in a particular region of the world or a particular nation. Others focus on a particular issue or political phenomenon, such as terrorism, political instability, or voting behavior.

    All political systems share certain characteristics. Figure 1.2 depicts one famous model, developed by political scientist David Easton in 1965. This model suggests that all political systems function within the context of political cultures, which consist of traditions, values, and common knowledge. It assumes citizens have expectations of and place demands on the political system, but they also support the system in various ways: They may participate in government, vote, or simply obey the laws of the state. The demands they make and supports they provide in turn influence the government’s decisions, edicts, laws, and orders.

    Simplified Model of the Political System.

    Countries and cultures differ in countless ways. Focusing on these differences makes it possible to classify or categorize political systems in ways that can aid our understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of each type. This book distinguishes among democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian states.

    Typologies change over time, reflecting new trends and seismic shifts in world politics or the global economy. For example, after the fall of Communism, the distinction between established liberal democracies and “transitional states” gained currency (see Chapter 8). It also became fashionable to distinguish between viable states and so-called failed states (see Chapter 9). The main types of totalitarian systems—the Nazi or Fascist model on the right and the Communist model on the left—are either defunct (most notably Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia) or depend on foreign investment and access to global markets (China and Vietnam). As a result, there is a tendency to gloss over or ignore the totalitarian model today even though some unreconstructed examples of this extremely repressive system still exist (North Korea and Cuba). And perhaps because many countries (including the United States and our NATO allies in Europe) are now locked in an interdependent relationship with China, there is also a tendency to sweep gross human rights violations under the rug.

    International Relations

    Specialists in international relations analyze how nations interact. Why do nations sometimes live in peace and harmony but go to war at other times? The advent of the nuclear age, of course, brought new urgency to the study of international relations, but the threat of an all-out nuclear war now appears far less menacing than other threats, including international terrorism, global warming, energy security, and, most recently, the economic meltdown.

    Although war and peace are ever-present problems in international relations, they are by no means the only ones. The role of morality in foreign policy continues to be a matter of lively debate. Political realists argue that considerations of national interest have always been paramount in international politics and always will be.* Others argue that enlightened self-interest can lead to world peace and an end to the cycle of war. Realists often dismiss such ideas as too idealistic in a dog-eat-dog world. Idealists counter that realists are too fatalistic and that war is not inevitable but rather a self-fulfilling prophecy. Still others say the distinction between the national interest and international morality is exaggerated; that democracies, for example, derive mutual benefit from protecting each other and that in so doing they also promote world peace.*

    The Power of Ideas

    In politics, money talks—or so people say. Listening to the news, it’s easy to get the impression that Congress is up for sale. As a summer intern in the United States Senate many years ago, one of the first things I was told is, “Son, in Washington it isn’t what you know but who you know.”

    Often we start out life being idealistic and then quickly run up against reality. For young students of politics, it is easy to fall into a trap, to lurch from one extreme to the other. If money is all that matters, justice is an illusion, ideas are irrelevant, and things can never change. But is it true? Are the cynics the smart ones?

    One view, recently showcased in The Economist, holds that intelligence, not money, is what really matters: smart people are the inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs who make things happen: “The strongest force shaping politics is not blood or money but ideas.”* Big movements in world history are propelled by big ideas, and “the people who influence government the most are often those who generate compelling ideas.” If true, ideas do matter and justice is possible.

    According to this argument, intelligence is the great equalizer in a globalized and competitive world operating on market principles. The children of the poor can—and often do—have greater native intelligence than rich kids. Thus, a college dropout (Mark Zuckerberg) can have a bright idea, launch a social network called Facebook on the Internet, and become a billionaire in his mid-20s. Years earlier, another college dropout with an idea (Bill Gates III) started a computer software company called Microsoft and soon reached the top of the Fortune 400 list of the world’s richest individuals. Gates remained at the top of that list in 2013.

    But entrepreneurs who control billions of dollars in assets (Rupert Murdoch and the Koch brothers are a few other well-known examples) do not operate only in the business world and economy—they also invest heavily in politics and government. Do ideas still have a chance in today’s political marketplace? Do smart people get elected to high office in the same way as they climb the corporate ladder to become CEOs and join the ranks of the super-rich? This book will challenge you to think about such questions.

    And one word of caution: Don’t expect to find easy answers. And don’t expect the answers to be revealed suddenly in a burst of divine light. The role of education is to ask the right questions. The key to a life well lived is to search for the right answers—wherever that might take you.

    Summary

    Understanding politics is a matter of self-interest. By exploring politics, we gain a better appreciation of what is—and what is not—in the public interest.

    This chapter focuses on three fundamental concepts: power, order, and justice. It also explores the interrelationships between power and order, order and justice, and justice and power.

    Political power can be defined as the capacity to maintain order in society. Whenever governments promulgate new laws or sign treaties or go to war, they are exercising political power. Whenever we pay our taxes, put money in a parking meter, or remove our shoes prior to boarding an airplane, we, in effect, bow to the power of government.

    When governments exercise power, they often do it in the name of order. Power and authority are closely related: authority is the official exercise of power. If we accept the rules and the rulers who make and enforce them, then government also enjoys legitimacy.

    Questions of justice are often embedded in political disputes. If the public interest is not advanced by a given policy or if society no longer accepts the authority of the government as legitimate, the resulting discontent can lead to political instability and even rebellion or revolution.

    Political science seeks to discover the basic principles and processes at work in political life. Classical political theory points to moral and philosophical truths, political realism stresses the role of self-interest and rational action, and behaviorism attempts to find scientific answers through empirical research and data analysis. Most political scientists specialize in one or more subfields such as political theory, U.S. government and politics, comparative politics, international relations, political economy, public administration, or public policy.

    Politics matters. This simple truth was tragically illustrated by the rise of Nazism in Germany. The bad news is that sometimes war is necessary to defeat a monstrous threat to world order and humanity. The good news is that there are often political or diplomatic solutions to conflict and injustice in human affairs. It is this fact that makes the study of politics forever obligatory and essential.

     

     

     

    Chapter 2. The Idea of the Public Good: Ideologies and Isms

    Learning Objectives

    · 1Define the public good.

    · 2Identify the three kinds of political ideologies.

    · 3Identify the five core values.

    · 4Describe the difference between a liberal and a conservative, as well as how these terms have changed over time.

    · 5Determine whether or not one ideology or political persuasion better guarantees freedom, justice, and democracy.

    In Lewis Carroll’s classic tale Alice in Wonderland, Alice loses her way in a dense forest and encounters the Cheshire Cat who is sitting on a tree branch. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” asks Alice. “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” replies the Cat. “I don’t much care where,” says Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” muses the Cat.

    Like Alice lost in the forest, we too occasionally find ourselves adrift when trying to make sense of complex issues, controversies, and crises. Governments and societies are no different. Political leadership can be woefully deficient or hopelessly divided over the economy or the environment or health care or a new threat to national security. Intelligent decisions, as Alice’s encounter with the Cheshire Cat illustrates, can take place only after we have set clear aims and goals. Before politics can effectively convert mass energy (society) into collective effort (government), which is the essence of public policy, we need a consensus on where we want to go or what we want to be as a society a year from now or perhaps ten years down the road. Otherwise, our leaders, like the rest of us, cannot possibly know how to get there. There are plenty of people eager to tell us what to think. Our purpose is to learn how to think about politics.

    Political Ends and Means

    In politics, ends and means are inextricably intertwined. Implicit in debates over public policy is a belief in the idea of the public good, that it is the government’s role to identify and pursue aims of benefit to society as a whole rather than to favored individuals. But the focus of policy debates is often explicitly about means rather than ends. For example, politicians may disagree over whether a tax cut at a particular time will help promote the common good (prosperity) by encouraging saving and investment, balancing the national budget, reducing the rate of inflation, and so on. Although they disagree about the best monetary and fiscal strategies, both sides would agree that economic growth and stability are proper aims of government.

    In political systems with no curbs on executive authority, where the leader has unlimited power, government may have little to do with the public interest. * In constitutional democracies, by contrast, the public good is associated with core values such as security, prosperity, equality, liberty, and justice (see Chapter 13). These goals are the navigational guides for keeping the ship of state on course. Arguments about whether to tack this way or that, given the prevailing political currents and crosswinds, are the essence of public policy debates.

    Ideologies and the Public Good

    The concept of Left and Right originated in the European parliamentary practice of seating parties that favor social and political change to the left of the presiding officer; those opposing change (or favoring a return to a previous form of government), to the right. “You are where you sit,” in other words.

    Today, people may have only vague ideas about government or how it works or what it is actually doing at any given time. * Even so, many lean one way or another, toward conservative or liberal views. When people go beyond merely leaning and adopt a rigid, closed system of political ideas, however, they cross a line and enter the realm of ideology. Ideologies act as filters that true believers (or adherents) use to interpret events, explain human behavior, and justify political action.

    The use of labels—or “isms” as they are often called—is a kind of shorthand that, ideally, facilitates political thought and debate rather than becoming a way to discredit one’s political opponents. One note of caution: these labels do not have precisely the same meaning everywhere. Thus, what is considered “liberal” in the United Kingdom might be considered “conservative” in the United States (see Figure 2.1).

    Figure 2.1.

      U.S. Conservatives * British Liberals *
    Constitutionalism Yes Yes
    Religious tolerance Yes Yes
    Market economy Yes Yes
    Protectionism No No
    Pacifism No No

    Focus Conservative or Liberal?

    Conservatives in the United States traditionally favor a strong national defense, deregulation of business and industry, and tax cuts on capital gains (income from stocks, real estate, and other investments) and inheritances. They often staunchly oppose social spending (“welfare”) on the grounds that giveaway programs reward sloth and indolence.

    By contrast, liberals tend to favor public assistance programs, cuts in military spending, a progressive tax system (one that levies higher taxes on higher incomes), and governmental regulation in such areas as the food and drug industry, occupational safety and health, housing, transportation, and energy.

    Prior to the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s, Republicans championed balanced budgets and limited government. In 2012–2014, Tea Party Republicans in Congress led the fight for deficit reduction, but insisted that it be done without raising taxes on the wealthy. Democrats countered by demanding that budget cuts be offset with targeted tax increases, in particular on individual earnings in excess of $400,000 and capital gains.

    Compared to Europe’s parliamentary democracies, the political spectrum in the United States is shifted to the right. Ideas and policies widely viewed as “socialist” in the United States—national health care, for example—are mainstream in European countries. Any attempts to tamper with social programs in so-called welfare states are likely to provoke a public outcry, as the anti-austerity protests that have swept across Europe (notably, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and France) in recent years attest.

    The word “liberal” is frequently associated with leftist views in the United States, where talking heads on FOX News routinely call President Obama’s policy initiatives “socialist.” But “liberal” has always meant something quite different in the United Kingdom, where it originated. There the term still denotes a desire to maximize individual liberty as the first principle of good government.

    Leftists in Europe often belong to socialist parties, but there is no viable Socialist Party in the United States and never has been. In the May 2012 presidential election, for example, voters in France handed Socialist Party leader Francois Hollande a sweeping victory, giving the Socialists an absolute majority of 300 seats in the National Assembly. (What if that were to happen in the U.S.? You can’t imagine it? That’s because it can’t happen here, which begs the question: Why?)

    We’ll learn more about European politics in general, and France in particular, in Chapter 7; for now, think of Socialists winning elections as a measure of the vast differences in the way Americans and Europeans define the public good.

    In this chapter, we group ideologies under three headings: antigovernment ideologies, right-wing ideologies, and left-wing ideologies. Left and Right are very broad categories, however, and there are many shades of gray. Only when the political system becomes severely polarized, as it did, for example, in Germany between the two world wars, are people forced to choose between black and white.

    In the two-party system of the United States, the choice is limited to red (Republican) and blue (Democrat). After September 11, 2001, the political climate became more polarized and partisan, as reflected in the charged rhetoric of media figures like Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, and Sean Hannity on the right and of Keith Olbermann and Rachel Maddow on the left. Between 2010 and 2014, the most extreme partisanship since World War II gave rise to governmental paralysis and gridlock in Congress, which in turn exacerbated political polarization and gave birth to the Tea Party movement. History provides sobering examples of what can happen when a government is dysfunctional, wealth is extremely concentrated, and people become disillusioned.

    Antigovernment Ideologies

    Opposition to government in principle is anarchism. The Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), who reveled in the “joy of destruction” and called for violent uprisings by society’s beggars and criminals, is often considered the father of modern anarchism. A close relative of anarchism is nihilism, which glorifies destruction as an end in itself rather than as a means to overthrow the existing system or rebuilding society. In Russia during the last half of the nineteenth century, anarchists helped to precipitate the discontent that led to the 1905 Revolution, sometimes called a dress rehearsal for the 1917 October Revolution.

    Ideologies of the Right

    Monarchism is at the opposite end of the political spectrum. Until the twentieth century, monarchy was the prevalent form of government throughout the world. Whether they were called kings or emperors, czars or sultans, or sheiks or shahs, monarchs once ruled the world. Aristotle regarded monarchy—rule by a wise king—as the best form of government (although he recognized that wise kings, as opposed to tyrants, were very rare).

    However archaic it may look to modern eyes, monarchism is not dead. Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf ministates, as well as Bhutan, Brunei, and Swaziland, are still monarchies. Jordan and Morocco are limited monarchies; in both countries, the chief executive rules for life by virtue of royal birth rather than by merit, mandate, or popular election. Most other countries that still pay lip service to monarchism are, in fact, constitutional monarchies in which the king or queen is a figurehead. The United Kingdom is the example we know best in the United States, but Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden all have monarchs as titular rulers.

    After World War I, fascism supplanted monarchism as the principal ideology of the extreme Right. In Germany, National Socialism—more commonly known as Nazism—was a particularly virulent form of this ideology (see Chapter 6). Predicated on the “superiority” of one race or nation and demanding abject obedience to authority, fascism exerted a powerful influence in Europe and South America from the 1920s to the 1940s. The prime examples in history are the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) in World War II, but other instances of authoritarian regimes bearing a close resemblance to fascism—including Spain (Francisco Franco), Portugal (Oliveira Salazar), and Hungary (Miklos Horthy)—existed in this period as well.

    Argentina under Juan Perón (1946–1955) closely resembled the fascist model after World War II, as did military dictatorships in Brazil, Paraguay, and several other Latin American countries. However, Perón never engaged in the kind of violence and mass repression associated with General Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1974–1990) or General Rafael Jorge Videla in Argentina (1976–1981). More recent examples include Kim Jong-Il of North Korea (who died in December 2011), Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (overthrown in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution), Muammar Qaddafi of Libya (also overthrown in 2011 as part of the wider “Arab Spring”), Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, and Bashar al-Assad of Syria (see Chapter 5).

    Fascism enjoyed mass support in many countries largely because of its appeal to nationalism, ethnicity, and (in the case of Nazi Germany) race. Other ideological roots of fascism can be found in romanticism, xenophobia, populism, and even a form of hierarchical socialism (discussed below).

    One of the distinguishing features of many extreme right-wing ideologies is a blatant appeal to popular prejudices and hatred.* Such an appeal often strikes a responsive chord when large numbers of people, who are part of the racial or ethnic majority, have either not shared fully in the benefits of society or have individually and collectively suffered severe financial reversals. In turbulent times, people are prone to follow a demagogue, to believe in conspiracy theories, and to seek scapegoats, such as a racial, ethnic, or religious minority group; an opposing political party; a foreign country; and the like. Xenophobia and antipathy to foreigners, immigrants, and even tourists have been on the rise in many European countries (including France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and in the United States since the 1990s. Remnants of the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) have lingered as well.

    Belief in racial superiority supplies an underlying rationale for a whole range of radical policies dealing with immigration (foreigners must be kept out), civil rights (African Americans, Jews, and other minorities are genetically inferior and do not deserve the same constitutional protections as whites), and foreign policy (threats to white America must be met with deadly force). At the far-right extreme, these groups are organized along paramilitary lines, engage in various survivalist practices, and preach violence. Although the KKK has largely faded from view, it still has die-hard followers, including some in law enforcement. In February 2009, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the firing of State Highway Patrol trooper Robert Henderson for his ties to the KKK. The KKK’s long history of violence toward African Americans—symbolized by the white sheets worn by its members and the crosses set ablaze at rallies—has made it synonymous with bigotry and racial intolerance.

    The Religious Right

    The religious right in the United States emerged as an important nationwide political force in 1980. The election as president of a conservative Republican, Ronald Reagan, both coincided with and accelerated efforts to create a new right-wing political coalition in the United States. The coalition that emerged combined the modern political techniques of mass mailings, extensive political fundraising, and the repeated use of the mass media (especially television) with a call for the restoration of traditional values, including an end to abortion, the reinstatement of prayer in public schools, a campaign against pornography, the recognition of the family as the basis of U.S. life, and a drive to oppose communism relentlessly on every front.

    This movement contained a core of fundamentalist or evangelical Christians, called the New Right, who saw politics as an outgrowth of their core religious values. Beginning in the 1980s, television evangelists such as the late Jerry Falwell (who spearheaded a movement called the Moral Majority) and Pat Robertson (who ran unsuccessfully for president in 1988) gained a mass following. The far right suffered a setback in 1992 when Pat Buchanan’s presidential bid also fizzled.

    The election of George W. Bush, who openly courted the fundamentalist Christian vote, was widely viewed as victory for the religious right. Roman Catholics and Southern Baptists, along with other evangelical groups, joined forces in a new kind of coalition against what many regular churchgoers saw as an alarming upsurge in immorality and sinful behavior, including abortion, gay marriage, and the teaching of evolution in public schools. The last issue, along with stem cell research, pitted religion against science.

    The Christian Coalition, another conservative group, has roots in the Pentecostal church. Boasting as many as one million members, the Christian Coalition produces and distributes a kind of morality scorecard, evaluating political candidates’ positions on key issues from the perspective of religious dogma. Its members focus on getting elected to local school boards in order to advocate for patriotism (as opposed to multiculturalism), religion, and a return to the basics in education.

    The Christian Coalition’s success raised two serious questions. First, was the Christian Coalition best understood as a well-meaning effort by decent citizens to participate in the political arena or as a dangerously divisive blurring by religious bigots of the separation between church and state? Second, was it an interest group or a political party?

    The 2008 and 2012 elections both pointed to the possibility that the political potency of the religious right in U.S. politics was declining. Some critics have suggested revoking the tax-exempt status of religious establishments that cross the line and transform themselves into political movements.* But the strength of religious fundamentalists, particularly in the South and Midwest, combined with an antiquated scheme of representation that gives small, sparsely populated states disproportionate voting power in Congress, makes it likely that religion will continue to play a huge role in American politics at all levels in the years to come.

    Capitalism

    The dominant ideology in the United States, Europe, and Asia today is capitalism. Even in Communist China, where Maoism remains the official ideology, capitalism is the engine driving the amazing revitalization of the economy since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The collapse of communism and its explicit rejection of private property, the profit motive, and social inequality was a triumphant moment for proponents of free enterprise and the free-market economy. Indeed, the Cold War was in no small measure an ideological contest between the United States and the Soviet Union over this very issue.

    In the contemporary world, capitalism is the ideology of mainline conservatives; at the same time, however, it is a basic feature of classical liberalism. In the United States, it is the Republican Party that most enthusiastically embraces capitalism, although few Democrats in Congress ever dare to denounce big business. However disappointing or frustrating this fact may be to some rank-and-file voters, it is not difficult to discern the reasons for it. Capitalism is the ideology of big business, as well as of powerful Washington lobbies, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. It also provides the moral and philosophical justification for the often ruthless practices of multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Walmart, Microsoft, McDonald’s, and Wall Street financiers—practices that would otherwise appear to be based on nothing more high-minded than the idea that “greed is good.” (The U.S. actor Michael Douglas won an Academy Award for his performance in Wall Street, a 1987 film in which his “Master of the Universe” character spoke those very words.)

    What is capitalism? It means different things to different people. It can refer to an economic theory based on the principles found in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (discussed later in this chapter). Or it can mean an ideology that elevates the virtues of freedom and independence, individualism and initiative, invention and innovation, risk-taking and reward for success. We can also view it as an elaborate myth system used to justify the class privileges of a wealthy elite and the exploitation of the workers who produce society’s wealth. The latter interpretation, of course, derives most notably from the writings of Karl Marx (see “Ideologies of the Left” section in this chapter).

    As an economic theory, capitalism stresses the role of market forces—mainly supply and demand—in regulating economic activity; determining prices, values, and costs; and allocating scarce resources. In theory it opposes government interference, and in practice it opposes government regulation. It applauds the notion that, in the words of President Calvin Coolidge, “the business of America is business.” Capitalism’s proponents, however, often assume we have a free market operating solely on the principles of supply and demand; they seldom consider whether it really exists. In fact, the free market is a myth, useful for public relations or propaganda but not for understanding how modern economies actually work. No modern economy can function without all sorts of rules and regulations. The question is not whether rules are necessary but rather who makes the rules and in whose interests. The key to the success of a market economy is competition, not deregulation.

    As an ideology, capitalism opposes high taxes (especially on business), social welfare, and government giveaways. Conservatives tend to believe wealth is a sign of success and a reward for virtue. Rich people deserve to be rich. Poverty is the fault of poor people themselves, who are lazy, indolent, and irresponsible. Relieving poverty is the job of charity and the church, not government. Capitalists also tend (or pretend) to believe in the trickle-down theory: if the most enterprising members of society are permitted to succeed and to reinvest wealth, rather than handing it all over to the tax collector, the economy will grow, prosperity will trickle down to the lower levels, and everybody will be better off.

    Critics of capitalism argue that the free market is a fiction and that big business only pretends to support deregulation and the increased competition it fosters. Meanwhile, giant corporations routinely seek tax favors, subsidies, and regulatory concessions and fight antitrust legislation at every turn. Revelations of large-scale fraud and corruption in recent years, symbolized by such fallen corporate outlaws as Enron and WorldCom, had badly stained the image of U.S. business even before the financial meltdown in the fall of 2008. But then came the failure of major investment firms like Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch in 2008, followed by bailouts of banks, automakers, and insurance giant AIG teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.

    One measure of how far the corporate sector had fallen in the public esteem: the insurance giant AIG (American International Group) saw its stock plunge from a 52-week high of $52.25 to a low of $0.38 in February 2009. Sensational front page stories of fraud, misfeasance, and self-aggrandizement associated with such prominent financiers such as Bernie Madoff, Robert Allen Stanford, and Jamie Dimon—CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Company blamed for a $2 billion trading loss in 2012—further undermined public trust in business, banks, and Wall Street. Prominent pundits with national audiences—writers like Bill Moyers, Matt Taibbi, Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and William Black—kept these stories from fading and furnished a steady stream of evidence about collusion between Washington and Wall Street, corruption in Congress, and crime in the suites.

    Proponents of libertarianism generally agree with the axiom, “That government is best, which governs least.” Like classical liberals, libertarians stress the value of individual liberty; but an obsession with fighting all forms of government regulation—even measures aimed at public safety or income security for the elderly—often leads them to embrace policies at odds with logic or common sense. Thus, for example, to quote libertarian Senator Rand Paul (son of 2012 presidential candidate Ron Paul) in a 2002 letter to the Bowling Green Daily News, “a free society will abide unofficial, private discrimination, even when that means allowing hate-filled groups to exclude people based on the color of their skin.” Paul also opposed gun control, called for the United States to withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and advocated abolishing the Federal Reserve System.

    Ideologies of the Left

    Left-wing ideologies propose a view of human beings living together harmoniously without great disparities in wealth or social classes. In contrast to capitalism, public goods take priority over private possessions. If equality is the end, state control is the means—control of everything from banking, transportation, and heavy industry to the mass media, education, and health care.

    Socialism is fundamentally opposed to capitalism, which contends that private ownership and enterprise in the context of a competitive free-market economy is the best and only way to bring about prosperity. Socialism is “an ideology that rejects individualism, private ownership, and private profits in favor of a system based on economic collectivism, governmental, societal, or industrial-group ownership of the means of production and distribution of goods, and social responsibility.”*

    Politics and Pop Culture The Russians Are Coming! “007” to the Rescue

    During the Cold War (1945–1991), Hollywood produced dozens of films aimed at addressing and sometimes exploiting movie-goers’ fear of Communism. Among the most famous films of this genre are Conspirator (1949) starring Elizabeth Taylor; Trial (1955); Rio Bravo (1956), starring John Wayne; The Manchurian Candidate (1962); Dr. Strangelove (1964); Seven Days in May (1964); The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (1965), based on John le Carré’s eponymous best-seller; The Russians Are Coming, the Russians Are Coming (1966); and Three Days of the Condor (1975).

    Perhaps the most famous hero of the genre is “007.” Ian Fleming created the fictional character of James Bond (aka 007) in 1953 as the Cold War was building and a hot war (in Korea) was raging. The character has since been adapted for all manner of popular culture uses, especially film. Starting with Dr. No in 1962, James Bond movies (23 so far!) are now the longest running and the second highest grossing film series in history. Skyfall (2012) and Spectre (2015) are the most recent installments.

    The University of Washington Library has compiled a selective list of Cold War films (“The Red Scare: A Filmography”), which can be viewed online. Here is their brief introduction to this list:

    The films produced in Hollywood before, during and after the Cold War Red Scare make for an interesting study in the response of a popular medium caught in a political firestorm…. [Some] motion pictures played a role in fueling the Red Scare, in propagandizing the threat of Communism and in a few rare and rather veiled cases, in standing up to the charges of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)….

    HUAC interrogated many film industry people. In the end, countless careers were destroyed but only ten individuals actually went to jail. This group came to be known as “The Hollywood Ten.”… An exhaustive analysis … indicated that none of the 159 films credited … to The Hollywood Ten contained Communist propaganda.

    Similarly, since 9/11, countless films and TV series pander to the American public’s fascination with terrorism—and seek to profit from it (see Chapter 16).

    · Spy-thrillers in book form and in films are extremely popular and often hugely profitable. They have the power to entertain us and also to shape our views of the world. Do films like the ones about Communism and the Cold War serve a useful purpose in society beyond entertainment? Is there a sharp distinction between art and propaganda? Think about it.

    (Hint: It has been said that “propaganda is direct while art is reflective.” In this view, art doesn’t change us but rather makes us more aware of what we already know or think we know, and it can either intensify or challenge our preconceptions.)

    Communism is sometimes used interchangeably with Marxism, named after its founder Karl Marx (1818–1883). Marx and his associate Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) envisioned a radical transformation of society attainable only by open class conflict aimed at the overthrow of “monopoly capitalism.”

    Marx and Engels opened the famous Communist Manifesto (1848) with the bold assertion, “All history is the history of class struggle.” All societies, Marx contended, evolve through the same historical stages, each of which represents a dominant economic pattern (the thesis) that contains the seeds of a new and conflicting pattern (the antithesis). Out of the inexorable clash between thesis and antithesis—a process Marx called dialectical materialism—comes a synthesis, or a new stage in socioeconomic development. Thus, the Industrial Revolution was the capitalist stage of history, which succeeded the feudal stage when the bourgeoisie (urban artisans and merchants) wrested political and economic power from the feudal landlords. The laws of history—or dialectic—which made the rise of capitalism inevitable, also make “class struggle” between capitalists (the owning class) and the proletariat (the working class) inevitable—and guarantee the outcome.

    Marxist theory holds that the main feature of the modern industrial era is the emergence of two antagonistic classes—wealthy capitalists, who own the means of production, and impoverished workers, the proletariat, who are paid subsistence wages. The difference between those wages and the value of the products created through the workers’ labor is surplus value, or excessive profits, which the capitalists pocket. In this way, owners systematically exploit the workers and unwittingly lay the groundwork for a proletarian revolution.

    How? According to Marx’s law of capitalist accumulation, the rule is get big or get out. Bigger is always better. Small companies lose out or are gobbled up by big ones. In today’s world of mergers and hostile takeovers, Marx appears nothing less than prescient here. Eventually, the most successful competitors in this dog-eat-dog contest force all the others out, thus ushering in the era of monopoly capitalism, the last stage before the downfall of the whole capitalist system.

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Realism,” in

ers from th d remind us s opposed dition.

m’

The Nationa of realism tainly a rev system wo

lance agai military and he 2002 N d States su ability, even hreats.

vasion and ours before mbers of the ution that c he danger t lived up to

alization of q War, 200

Iraq m Hussein… bed by cla to do with

anguage of t are the ve eans, and t values of t

n Internatio

hat of scho s, howeve to purely s

al Interest, he describ

vision of tra orks, which nst it. Krau

d political c ational Sec

uggested th n when mu

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World Pol 3

… is charac ssical real the inabili

f justice. T ery opposit the genera the commu

onal Relatio

olars who e r, of the co systemic fo

conservat bed as the aditional re h holds tha uthammer a competition curity Docu hat it would uch of the r

n of Iraq in was due to

Council ha e disarmam ur resolve nsibilities,

itics 6e

cterized by ism but to ty to formu

The second te of those ally negativ unity.

ons Theori

espouse th onsequenc ormulation

tive comm ‘new unila

ealist at when a h and the Bu

n from rival ument, a ‘b d be the be rest of the

n precisely begin, Pre

ave publicl ment of Ira to meet it… so we will

y three which

ulate d is hubris, e ve

ies:

e tenets ces of ns), as

entator teralism’

hegemon ush l powers balance of enign world is

these esident y

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Box 1.3:

The form determina those glob far beyon potentially and unas dominanc

Ch Although as a whol power tha Box 1.4:

In Greek t with powe internatio

Leb 3) The ra Some of t forcefully main argu Mearshei US nation aggressio of massiv work even

Baylis,

niversity Pre

Krautham of realism

ation to sel bal ends. N d narrow s y, terrorists hamedly fo

ce for the fo

harles Krau

the United e, Lebow b

at led to mi

Hubris an tragedies, er and disr nal commu

bow, “Clas

tionality o

the most p against th

ument, ma mer and S

nal interest on since th ve retaliatio n if Saddam

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

mmer on th that I am a

lf-consciou Note: globa self-defenc s) of WMD or maintain oreseeable

uthammer,

d States fra believes th istakes.

nd America success a egard, eve unity led th

ssical Real

of Saddam

rominent c e decision de by struc

Stephen Wa t. Realists, e first Gulf

on, had wo m Hussein

 

d Owens: T Case Study

he New Un arguing for

usly and co al ends… T ce… One c is not a gl

ning unipol e future.

‘The Unip

amed its un hat it was p

an Power and power en contemp he Bush ad

lism,” p. 66

m Hussein

contempora of the Bus

ctural or ne alt (see ch in particul

f War, with rked. They

n possesse

The Globa y: The Iraq

nilateralism r – call it th

onfidently d The new u can hardly lobal end… larity, for s

olar Mome

nilateralism precisely th

are the pri pt, for the U dministratio

6.

ary realist sh adminis eorealist sc .8) was tha lar, argued a combina y also argu ed weapon

alization of q War, 200

m’ he new uni deploy Ame nilateralism argue that

… The new ustaining A

ent Revisite

m as somet his America

ncipal cau USA’s trad on to hubris

scholars in stration to i cholars su at invading

d that the e ation of ec ued that de s of mass

World Pol 3

lateralism erican pow m defines A t depriving

w unilateral America’s u

ed’, 603, 6

thing prote an overcon

ses of hub ditional allie s.

n the Unite nvade and ch as Ken

g Iraq was efforts to de onomic sa

eterrence w destruction

itics 6e

– is clear wer in the p American Saddam ( ism argues unrivalled

604, 607.

ective of th nfidence in

bris. US int es and the

ed States c d occupy Ir Waltz, Joh simply not

eter Iraq fr anctions an would cont n.

in its pursuit of interests (and s explicitly

e world n its own

toxication wider

came out raq. The hn t in the om

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Box 1.5:

No matter not work,” designed ways that supports. think we h weaponry “Saddam and over undeterra said, “I do He’s been

Co Many rea was there would hav conseque never use Iraq did n chemical him from that have done so, t Box 1.5:

In short, a doesn’t ta reasonab

Joh

Baylis,

niversity Pre

Waltz on D r how often ” it works a to accomp

t would end So the qu

have to wo y that they Hussein d again, peo

able. “Do yo o not want n in power

onversation

lists sugge efore unnec ve been irr ences of ne ed weapon ot use suc or biologic using wea bombed Ir

they sugge

The Wron an invasion ake a realis ly objective

hn Mearsh

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

Deterring n the Bush as well as i plish. That danger the estion red

orry about S could not w

did it,” and ople say — ou want to to rely on for thirty y

n with Ken

ested that a cessary. B rational of ear-certain ns of mass ch weapons cal warhea pons of ma raq repeat ested, prov

ng War n of Iraq is st to figure e, and focu

heimer and

d Owens: T Case Study

Saddam h administra it ever did is, it deter

e manifestly uces to: M Saddam H well get fro we’d slam and we he

o rely on th the sanity

years.

Waltz

a policy of Because re Iraq to use defeat. In destructio s against U ds at Israe ass destru edly over t ved his rati

the wrong this out, h

ussed on t

d Stephen

The Globa y: The Iraq

ation peop for the pur

rs other co y vital inte

Might they g Hussein do om sources him. He k

ear it every e sanity of of Saddam

‘vigilant co alists assu

e weapons the words

on against a US forces d el. If Sadda uction again the past de ionality and

g war in the owever – it he Americ

Walt, ‘”Rea

alization of q War, 200

ple say “co rposes that untries from rests of the give these ing that, be s other tha

knows that… y day — tha f Saddam H m Hussein.

ontainmen ume that st

of mass d s of Mearsh an adversa during the

am cannot nst US forc ecade?’ Th d therefore

e wrong pla t only take an nationa

alists” are n

World Pol 3

ntainment t we alway m using th e United S things awa ecause if a an Iraq, we … It’s a fun at these rog Hussein?” .” I do! This

t’ was prov tate actors

destruction heimer and ary who ca gulf war a be deterre

ces in the P he fact that e the viabil

ace at the s someone

al interest.

not alone’.

itics 6e

and deter ys thought eir weapon

States or th ay? Well, I any terroris e would say nny thing, gues are George B

s guy is a s

ving enoug s are ration given the d Walt, ‘Ira an retaliate and did not ed, what is Persian Gu t he had no ity of deter

wrong time e who is se

 

rence do it was ns in ose it don’t

st ever got y, that over

ush has survivor.

gh; war al, it

aq has e in kind.

fire stopping

ulf, forces ot already rrence.

e. It ensible,

 

 

 

© Oxford U

Section 2 Liberal IR From read familiar w to consult repeated Where yo relevant c Introduct As noted and the 2 Iraq war a addition to Construct to Liberal have lear aspects o means ca internatio In this cas ‘humanita the notio 1) Iraq an Humanita holds that under thre good only may thrive sovereign may interv (1995) an In the cas remove S it as an ac remove w

Baylis,

niversity Pre

IR

2

R Theory a

ding Chap with the bas t this crucia here.

ou see brac chapter in T

tion

in the prev 003 invasi and its afte o this secti tivist, and A ism. The p nt from Ch

of the Iraq W an the follo nal theory

se study w arian inte

on of a ‘be

nd Human

arian interv t it is unde eat within i y to the ext e. If the sta

nty is forfeit vene for hu

nd Kosovo

se of Iraq, t Saddam Hu ct of self-d

weapons of

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

theory in

and the Ira

ter 7 of Th sic tenets o al chapter

cketed cha The Globa

vious sectio on of Iraq

ermath both ion, therefo Alternative purpose of hapter 6 of War from a wing be an might help

we will brief rvention’; nign’ liber

nitarian Int

vention is a rtaken by l illiberal sta tent it prov ate system ted. From umanitaria (1999).

the United ussein’s all efence. Fo f mass des

d Owens: T Case Study

Practice C

aq War

e Globaliz of Liberal In if you have

apter refere lization of

on of this c is ambival h contradic ore, you sh

e theory se this sectio The Globa

a Liberal pe n exhaustiv p you think

fly focus on 2) the spr

ral empire

tervention

a quintesse liberal dem

ates (see c ides for dis

matically an a liberal pe

an purpose

States’ pr eged weap

or some se struction we

The Globa y: The Iraq

Case Stud

zation of W nternationa e not done

ences, for World Pol

case study ent. Simila ct and sup hould cons ctions of th

on is to sug alization of erspective ve survey

k about the

n 1) wheth read of de

e.

n

ential libera mocratic reg h.30). In th stinct politi

nd violently erspective

es to stop t

rincipal just pons of ma

elf-describe ere insuffic

alization of q War, 200

dy: The Ira

World Politic al Relation

e so alread

example (s itics (6e.).

y, the relati arly, there a port eleme

sult the Rea he case stu ggest ways f World Po

e. As with th of the poss

e Iraq War a

her the inv emocracy

al foreign p gimes in o his view, st cal commu

y abuses th therefore,

he abuse i

tification fo ass destru ed liberals, cient groun

World Pol 3

aq War, 20

cs (6e.), yo ns (IR) theo dy as its con

see ch.4),

onship bet are many w ents of Libe alism, Mar udy for imp

s in which t litics (6e.) he previou sible ways and its afte

vasion con in the Mid

policy; conv rder to pro tate sovere unities with he rights of the intern n cases su

or the use o ction; Pres however,

nds for war

itics 6e

003

ou should n ory. You ar ntents will

this refers

tween real ways in wh eral IR theo rxism, portant alte the insights illustrate im

us section, s Liberal ermath.

nstitutes a ddle East;

ventional w otect huma eignty is a hin which i f individual ational com uch as Bos

of force wa sident Bush the allege r, and for t

now be re advised not be

to the

ist theory hich the ory. In

ernatives s you will mportant by no

a and 3)

wisdom an rights moral ndividuals ls, then mmunity snia

as to h framed

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reason, so liberate Ir the justific from Huss Box 2.1:

The distin clear. Fut of failing, public-spi

Ro Iraq was n structures has becom the huma There are interventio the test… that would option to s concerns. humanita was launc not design Box 2.2:

It would b lead wher terrorism States’ lon is having military in regardles

Mic 2) Spread Another s was that – entire Mid

Baylis,

niversity Pre

ome suppo raq from an cation has sein’s tyran

Liberal th nction betw ture military may be m rited.

obert Keoh

not a state s were stro me increas nitarian aim

e some imp on. As sum

…. Most imp d justify su stop Iraqi a . It was not rian law. It ched it was ned or carr

The Liber be a positiv re elected requires m ng term ad some trou tervention s of their o

chael Beru

d of Demo

significant j – after the i ddle East. T

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

orted the B n abusive d increasing nnical regi

eorist Rob ween self-d y action in ore likely t

ane, 2002,

e that could ong, if illegi singly diffic ms of the m

portant obj mmarized b portant, the uch interve atrocities. t conducte t was not a s reasonab ried out wi

ral Problem ve service t liberals ca

many things ddiction to ble providi in Iraq, wh

objectives.

ube, ‘Peace

ocracy in t

justification invasion – The examp

d Owens: T Case Study

Bush admin despotism. gly focused me.

bert Keoh defence an

failed stat to be descr

, p. 87

d conventio itimate. Th cult to legit military cam

ections to by Human e killing in I ntion. In ad Interventio

ed in a way approved b ble to belie th the need

m to democra nnot or wil s – peace oil – before ing that se hile the oth

e Puzzle’, p

the Middle

n used by t Iraq would ple of a ‘fre

The Globa y: The Iraq

nistration’s . And after d on the rig

hane on in d humanita

tes, or atte ribed both

onally be c he point to timate the mpaign.

the idea th Rights Wa Iraq at the ddition, inte

on was not y that maxi by the Secu eve that the ds of Iraqis

acy if left-w ll not, urgin in Israel an e it require rvice, beca

her wing op

p.319-20.

e East

the Bush a d act as a n ee’ Iraq wo

alization of q War, 200

s decision o r the war, w ght of the Ir

tervention arian interv mpts to bo as self-de

considered make, rath use of forc

hat Iraq co atch, ‘the in time was ervention w motivated mized com urity Counc e Iraqi peo s foremost

wing public ng their fel nd Palestin es any regi ause one w pposes all

administrat new democ ould accord

World Pol 3

on the grou when no we raqi citizen

n vention ma

olster state fence and

as ‘failing’ her, is that ce without s

nstituted h nvasion of not of the e was not the primarily b

mpliance w cil. And wh ple would t in mind’ (R

c intellectua low Americ ne, an end me change

wing of it a military int

tion in the r cratic beac dingly inspi

itics 6e

unds that i eapons we

ns to live in

ay become es that are

as human

‘ in that go since the some refer

humanitaria Iraq failed exceptiona e last reas by humani

with internat hile at the t be better o Roth, 2004

als would t cans that t to the Uni e in Iraq. B

actually sup terventions

run up to t con of hope ire other p

t would ere found, n freedom

e less in danger

nitarian or

vernment 1990s it rence to

an to meet

al nature sonable tarian tional time it off, it was 4).

take the he war on ited But the left pports s

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© Oxford U

the region human rig

Baylis,

niversity Pre

n to the be ght. This is

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

lief that de s a profoun

d Owens: T Case Study

emocracy w ndly liberal

The Globa y: The Iraq

was not jus argument

alization of q War, 200

st a Weste adopted b

World Pol 3

rn inventio by the Bush

itics 6e

on, but a un h administr

niversal ration.

 

 

 

© Oxford U

Box 2.3:

Regime c gravest of chance to would hav heart. And

Ric Some hav this libera Box 2.4:

The new spread of democrac cease bei forces of e through m

G. As you wi contempo broadly, d branch of explanatio resolution problem f other, term governme governme that the e and not b considere willingnes in Brown 3) Libera Traditiona state; the a foreign territories commenta

Baylis,

niversity Pre

Vice Pres

change in I f threats ar

o promote t ve to rethin d our abilit

chard Chen

ve argued al notion of

Ikenberry imperial th f democrac cy and the ing threats economic

military forc

John Iken

ill have lea orary libera democratic f the theory on, argues n and expe for the war med the st ent in demo ent and pu mpirical co etween a d

ed weaker; ss of the U et al, 1996

lism, Ben

ally, empire Roman em policy that for politica ators had p

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

ident Che

raq would re eliminat the values nk their stra ty to advan

ney, ‘The R

that, as m f spreading

y on demo hinkers also cy. This is rule of law

s… The pro forces and

ce.

nberry, 200

arned from al theory is c peace the y, which Br s that demo ect fellow d

between t tructural or ocratic cou blic debate orrelation f democracy in the cas nited State

6; see also

ign Empir

e denotes mpire was t seeks to s al and eco portrayed t

d Owens: T Case Study

eney on fre

bring abou ted, the fre that can b

ategy of Ji nce the Isra

Risks of In

anifest in t g democrac

cracy pro o incorpora not just ide

w are estab omotion of d political e

04, p. 626

Chapters democrat

eory has a ruce Russe ocracies fo emocracie the liberal r institution untries, suc e, make de for democr y and a no se of Iraq in es to go to Panke an

re, and Ira

a distinct t not a state

sustain a h nomic pow the United

The Globa y: The Iraq

eedom in

ut a numbe eedom-lovi bring lastin had. Mode aeli-Palest

action,’ p.2

the invasio cy in the re

motion ate Wilson ealism… it blished in t f democrac engagemen

7 and 8, o ic peace th complicate

ett has cal ollow intern es to do the United Sta

nal explana ch as chec emocracies ratic peace n-democra n 2003, it is war (Russ d Risse, 2

aq

type of poli e, but the B hierarchica wer. Even b States as

alization of q War, 200

the Middle

er of benef ng peoples g peace…

erates thro inian peac

299

on of Iraq, t egion:

ian ideas i is good na roubled co

cy is not lef nt – but, w

one of the c heory. As ed relation led the cul

national no e same; th ates and th ation, sugg cks and ba s less likely

e is stronge acy, this br s also cha sett, “Grasp 007, pp. 98

itical entity British emp

al relationsh before the the centre

World Pol 3

e East

fits to the re s of the reg Extremist ughout the

ce process

there was a

nto their vi ational sec ountries aro ft to the ind hen neces

chief branc with libera

nship to the tural or no rms of pea is would no e illiberal I ests that fe lances bet y to wage w est betwee ranch of the llenged by ping the D 8-105).

y which ma pire was. Im hip over ot Iraq war, w

e of a new

itics 6e

region. Wh gion will ha ts in the re e region wo would enh

an imperia

ision in urg curity policy ound the w direct, long ssary, it is p

ches of al theory m e Iraq war. ormative aceful conf ot, howeve Iraqi regim eatures of tween bran war at all.

en two dem e theory is

y the appar emocratic

ay or may n mperialism ther people writers and form of em

en the ave a gion ould take hance.

al logic to

ging the y. If

world, they g-term purveyed

ore One

flict er, pose a e. The

nches of Given

mocracies s generally rent Peace,”

not be a m, then, is es and d mpire with

 

 

 

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a distinctl this form o case stud One impo liberal em has rarely This chara imperial g Box 2.5:

No one ca foreign po when a lit

Nia Although immediate which ma makes no wants to e unnecess Discussio Do you co Many libe Empire: H British an thing’. Acc direction – global eco States is c bringing p historical

Baylis,

niversity Pre

y imperial of power a

dy).

ortant idea mpire, an ‘e y fallen into acteristic o

governmen

Historian an deny th olicy recalls ttle trouble

all Ferguso

the United ely after th

ay lead to th o claim that establish a sary.

on questio

onsider the

erals argue How Britain d America cording to – the supe onomy. In carrying on

peace, ‘free process.

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

foreign po and whethe

has been empire of lib o the trap o of US hege nt – how to

Niall Ferg e extent of s the gunb on the pe

on, quoted

d States wa he invasion he phased t it seeks t

a liberal de

on

e US involv

e that it is. M n Made the n power – w Ferguson,

erior system promoting n the globa edom’ and

d Owens: T Case Study

licy. The m er it should

that the Un berty’ that of making i emony may maintain c

guson on A f the Amer

boat diplom riphery cou

in Ikenber

as, in many n, there is n d withdrawa o govern I mocratic s

vement in I

Most contr e Modern W while also , Empire w m of “libera

contempo al good wo free mark

The Globa y: The Iraq

main disput d be welcom

nited State is relativel imperialism y have par control ove

American rican inform

macy of the uld be dea

rry, 2004, p

y senses, t now an inte al of US tro raq directly

system of g

Iraq to be a

roversially, World, mak telling us t

was justified al capitalism orary globa orks that Br kets to the

alization of q War, 200

te has bee med or fea

es operates y benign. T

m all about rtly resolve r diverse p

empire mal empire e British em alt with by a

p. 610

the traditio erim gover oops. The y for an ind governmen

a good thin

Niall Ferg kes sugges that the Br d because m” was un alization, Fe ritain used Middle Eas

World Pol 3

en over how ared (see S

s at the ce The extens t the occup d the prim

peoples in

e… Even re mpire in its a short-sha

onally impe rnment and point is tha definite per nt so that d

ng?

guson, in h stive conne ritish Empir it moved h iversalised erguson su to do. In t

st is part o

itics 6e

w to chara Section 4 o

entre of a d sion of US pation of te ary proble diverse ter

ecent Ame Victorian h

arp “surgic

erial occup d planned at the Unit riod, but th

direct contr

is recent b ections bet re was a ‘g history in th d, creating uggests, th this unders of the grand

cterise of this

istinctly power

erritory. m of rritories.

erican heyday, al strike.”

ier of Iraq elections, ed States

hat it rol is

book tween good he right the first

he United standing, d

 

 

 

© Oxford U

Section 3 Social Co From read familiar w this crucia here. Where yo relevant c Introduct In addition Alternativ The purpo from Cha the Iraq W section, h ways soc In this cas institutio war. 1) The im According level in a particular shaped by and the ru the two m general re regimes h liberal dem humanita when they Two majo seem relu against th However,

Baylis,

niversity Pre

IR

3

onstructiv

ding Chap with constru al chapter

ou see brac chapter in T

tion

n to this se e theory se ose of this pter 10 of

War from so however, by ial constru

se study, w ons; 2) the

mportance

g to constru way traditi ly, as Mart y Weberia ules or nor

most signific eluctance b have emerg mocratic b rian fashio y intervene

or criticisms uctant to in he wishes o in the run

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

Theory in

vist Theory

ter 10 of T uctivist theo if you have

cketed cha The Globa

ection you ections of section is The Globa ome of the y no mean ctivism mig

we will brie social co

of law an

uctivists, le ional realis tha Finnem n rational-l rms of inter cant featur by states to ged as und lueprint tha

on, Finnem e’ (2003: 8

s of the US ntervene, a of the UN S -up to the

d Owens: T Case Study

n Practice

y and the

The Globali ory in Inter e not done

apter refere lization of

should con the case s to sugges

alization of e construct ns can the ght help yo

fly focus o onstruction

d internat

egal norms st and liber more has w legal autho rnational o res of the c o resort to derwriters at states a ore sugge 7; c.f. Owe

S invasion nd second Security C invasion th

The Globa y: The Iraq

Case Stud

Iraq War

ization of W rnational R

e so already

ences, for World Pol

nsult the R study for im t ways in w

f World Pol tivist theore following b ou think ab

on 1) the im n of threa

tional inst

s structure ral theories written, ‘inte ority struct

organizatio current inte force. At t of internat

and other m sts, to ‘rec ens, 2004)

of Iraq we d, that it wa ouncil and he Bush ad

alization of q War, 200

dy: The Ira

World Polit Relations (I y as its con

example (s itics (6e.).

Realism, Lib mportant alt which the i litics (6e.) i etical persp be an exha bout the Ira

mportance t; and 3) th

titutions

social inte s are not a erstate use ures, spec ns’ (2003: ernational o the same t ional stabi

multilateral configure a .

re: first, th as principa d much of t dministratio

World Pol 3

aq War, 20

ics (6e.), y R). You ar ntents will

see ch.4),

beralism, M ternatives nsights yo illustrate im pectives. A austive surv aq War and

e of law an he identity

eraction at ble to pred

es of force cifically lega

21). Finne order are m ime, libera lity. With U agencies nd reconst

at the Unit lly a unilat he internat on stated t

itics 6e

003

you should re advised not be rep

this refers

Marxism, a to constru u will have

mportant as As with the rvey of the d its afterm

nd interna y politics o

the interna dict. More are increa al understa

emore sugg multilateral al-democra UN backing now use in truct probl

ted States teral invasi tional com that it did n

d now be to consult

peated

to the

and ctivism.

e learnt spects of

e previous possible

math.

ational of the

ational

asingly andings gests that lism and a

atic g, it is this n a em states

did not on munity.

not want

 

t

 

 

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to invade ensure th of mass d Box 3.1:

‘We wrote try to pres taking tha

U.S Secondar on Iraq wo inspectors The Bush popular), earlier res necessary gave the Box 3.2:

‘It is cruci were ado never bee military ac resolution

Ric Russia an 1441 (wh 2002) to a argued th secure re Security C invasion o around m seeking fu Realists, w this episo states are respond,

Baylis,

niversity Pre

Iraq; the b at war did

destruction

Colin Pow e [Security serve the p at one last

S. Secreta

rily, then-N ould maint s.

h administr contempla

solution ha y means’ t United Sta

Richard B al to under pted, only en formally ction at any ns.’

chard Butle

nd China, h ich declare authorize t at a secon al internati

Council, ind of Iraq bec uch of the urther auth

who are sc ode reveals e the most however, b

, Smith and C

ess, 2014.

build-up of not break without re

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Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

IR Theory in Practice Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003 Section 4 Marxist Theory and the Iraq War From reading Chapter 9 of The Globalization of World Politics (6e.), you should now be familiar with the basic tenets of Marxist International Relations (IR) theory. You are advised to consult this crucial chapter if you have not done so already as its contents will not be repeated here. Where you see bracketed chapter references, for example (see ch.4), this refers to the relevant chapter in The Globalization of World Politics (6e.). Introduction As with the other case studies, it will not take you long to realize that Marxists were the most critical of the Iraq War, especially the motives of the United States and the way in which the occupation and subsequent insurgency has affected the lives of ordinary Iraqis. In addition to this section, you should consult the Realism, Liberalism, Social Constructivism, and Alternative theories sections of the case study for important alternatives to Marxism. The purpose of this section is to suggest ways in which the insights you will have learnt from Chapter 9 of The Globalization of World Politics (6e.) illustrate important aspects of the Iraq War from a broadly Marxist perspective. Again, some of the authors mentioned in this part of the case study may not explicitly identify themselves as Marxist, however, they are certainly radical in comparison to Liberalism, Realism and Constructivism and they are all united in their critique of the United States’ actions. As with the previous section, by no means can the following be an exhaustive survey of the possible ways Marxist and radical international theory might help you think about the Iraq War and its aftermath. In this case study, we will briefly focus on 1) the political-economic motives for the war 2) the hypocrisy of the United States and 3) the suffering of civilians in Iraq through economic sanctions and war. 1) The Motives for the War The principal justification given by the Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq is well known – remove weapons of mass destruction and initiate regime change. Distinctive about Marxism as a theoretical approach is its focus on political economy and the logic of capitalism as the major factors in shaping world politics. Unlike a number of the other theories discussed in Globalization, Marxism does not take the inter-state system for granted. So although we might think of the Iraq war as a fairly traditional battle between a state and coalition of states, Marxists and others suggest that something else was also going on related to the structure of global capitalism. Recall that ‘No blood for oil’ was the mantra of the millions who protested the war.

 

 

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© Oxford University Press, 2014.

Box 4.1: Oil Wars

The Bush oligarchy wants direct control over a country whose proven oil reserves are second only to those of Saudi Arabia. American oil giants own none of this oil now. How much do you think they will own one year after the war? Direct US control over Iraqi oil will not only put the profits of selling the oil and servicing the oil fields into American hands, but will also put the US Government in a position to effect the price of oil by determining how much of it is put onto the market at any one time and to secure the dollar’s position as the currency of choice in the purchase of oil by other countries (since 2000, Iraq has tried to undermine the hegemony of the dollar in world trade—with all its implications for US financial domination —by selling its oil for Euros). And, as the availability of this non- renewable source of energy begins to decline (it has been estimated that the world has about fifty years worth of oil left), the US will be in a position to decide, almost unilaterally, which countries will grow and develop and which will not.

Bertell Ollman, ‘Why war with Iraq?’

In the words of Michael T. Klare, ‘In the first U.S. combat operation of the war in Iraq, Navy commandos stormed an offshore oil-loading platform. “Swooping silently out of the Persian Gulf night,” an overexcited reporter for the New York Times wrote on March 22, “Navy Seals seized two Iraqi oil terminals in bold raids that ended early this morning, overwhelming lightly-armed Iraqi guards and claiming a bloodless victory in the battle for Iraq’s vast oil empire.” A year and a half later, American soldiers are still struggling to maintain control over these vital petroleum facilities — and the fighting is no longer bloodless’ (‘Oil Wars’).

 

Although Marxists do not claim that the sole reason for war was to gain cheap access to oil it is argued that the United States has positioned itself as the policeman of world capitalism. Political-economic influence in the region is the most important factor, not weapons of mass destruction. Box 4.2: Why War? Strategic control

In the desperate flailing to contrive justifications as one pretext after another collapsed, the obvious reason for the invasion was conspicuously evaded by the administration and commentators: to establish the first secure military bases in a client state right at the heart of the world’s major energy resources, understood since World War II to be a “stupendous source of strategic power” and expected to become even more important in the future. There should have been little surprise at revelations that the administration intended to attack Iraq before 9-11, and downgraded the “war on terror” in favour of this objective.

Noam Chomsky, ‘The Resort to Force’.

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

Box 4.3: Why War? Links between oil and strategic control

In their quest for global supremacy and a capitalist world order favourable to US interests, Bush administration officials may well have believed that militarily-based strategic dominance in the Middle East, and an American hand on the world’s oil tap, would represent a bargaining chip of incalculable value when dealing with potentially incompliant allies and emergent rivals (especially China) even more dependent upon imported oil than the USA itself.

Mark Rupert, “Marxism and Critical Theory,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2007, p. 162 Other evidence in support of claims about the importance of oil may lie in the history of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, the latter of whom chaired the administration’s National Energy Policy task force and was a major advocate for the Iraq war (Rupert 2007: 162; Dreyfuss 2003: 44). Both are former oilmen with long-standing ties to oil companies that do business in the Middle East. 2) The Hypocrisy of the United States Marxists are highly critical of the motives of powerful states and the way in which they present themselves and their actions as benign. As the rationale for the invasion of Iraq shifted as no weapons were found and the link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda was shown to be non-existent, Marxists found much to criticise, especially when the rationale moved to the human rights of Iraqi civilians. Box 4.4 Contempt for Democracy

Nothing has been heard from the present incumbents — with their alleged concern for Iraqi democracy — to indicate that they have any regrets for their previous support for Saddam Hussein (or others like him, still continuing) nor have they shown any signs of contrition for having helped him develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when he really was a serious danger.

Noam Chomsky, ‘The Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy’ Between 1990 and 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom were the main underwriters of a debilitating economic sanctions regime against Iraq. While the sanctions were seemingly effective in preventing Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, they had a lethal effect on Iraq’s humanitarian situation. Given the massive human costs, Marxists question whether Bush and Blair’s claims to humanitarian principles should be accepted. Added to this is the high number of civilian casualties as a result of the war (discussed below). In short, Marxists suggest that American and British claims to humanitarian purposes are hypocritical.

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

3) Suffering of Iraqi civilians Marxism views itself as an ideology that has the interests of working and poor people at heart. As suggested in Ch.9 of The Globalization of World Politics, ‘Marxist theories are also discomforting, for they argue that the effects of global capitalism are to ensure that the powerful and wealthy continue to prosper at the expense of the powerless and the poor’. In relation to the Iraq war, therefore, the question is one of human cost, though of course, Marxists are not the only ones concerned with humanitarian cost. (Much has been said about this in other parts of this case study and in some sections of the Gulf War case study, and you should consult these sections for additional material.) By the end of 2004, however, independent security organization Iraqbodycount.net had estimated civilian casualties at 13,000 to 15,000. Within the Marxist paradigm, this evidence of widespread civilian casualties underscored the brutality of Western capitalist states.

 

 

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IR Theory in Practice Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003 Section 5 Post-colonial and Poststructuralist Approaches to the Iraq War From reading Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 of The Globalization of World Politics (6e), you should now be familiar with Post-colonialism and Poststructuralism (which you may hear called ‘alternative theories’ of International Relations). You are advised to consult these crucial chapters if you have not done so already as the contents will not be repeated here. The case study also references material covered in Chapter 17 on Feminist IR theory. Where you see bracketed chapter references, for example (see ch.4), this refers to the relevant chapter in The Globalization of World Politics (6e.). Introduction In addition to this section you should consult the Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, and Social Constructivist sections of the case study for important alternatives to the theories discussed here. The purpose of this section is to suggest ways in which the insights you will have learnt from Chapters 11 and 12 of The Globalization of World Politics (6e.) illustrate important aspects of the Iraq War from some of these alternative theoretical perspectives. As with the previous section, however, by no means can the following be an exhaustive survey of the possible ways alternative theories might help you think about the Iraq War and its aftermath. We will briefly focus on 1) Orientalist representations of Iraq; 2) the politics of ‘accidental’ civilian casualties; and 3) discourse analysis and Iraq. 1) Orientalist representations of Iraq The concept of Orientalism is central to postcolonial scholarship (see ch.12). The term, used by theorist Edward Said, describes the way in which the ‘West’ has constructed an image of the ‘East’ as its Other, the opposite against which it defines itself. Representations of the ‘East’, including the Middle East, have been central to Western economic and political domination. Before Said’s death in late 2003, he wrote that Orientalism highlighted the Western representations of Iraq used to justify war. In his words, ‘There’s been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women’s rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple, and agreed-upon concepts…’ (Orientalism 25 years later). Box 5.1: Edward Said on Orientalism and Iraq

Today bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of the strange Oriental peoples… Without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like “us” and didn’t appreciate “our” values–the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma–there would have been no war.

Edward Said, Orientalism 25 years later. The clash of civilisations that George Bush and his minions are trying to fabricate as a cover for a pre-emptive oil and hegemony war against Iraq is supposed to result in a triumph of democratic nation-building, regimes change and forced modernization à l’américaine. Never mind the bombs and the ravages of sanctions which are unmentioned. This will be a purifying war… Meanwhile, the soul-and-body destroying situation in Palestine worsens all the time.

Edward Said, ‘An Unacceptable Helplessness’, p.446. Post-colonial scholarship also found mainstream Western assumptions about the identity of the insurgents in post-war Iraq problematic. In the words of Tarak Barkawi, ‘The role of the Iraqi people is to want to be free, for only then can the United States understand itself as a liberator. Accordingly, the growing resistance to US occupation must be represented as somehow not emanating from ‘real’ Iraqis. It is very important that the fiction that the resistance in Iraq is mounted only by “Saddam loyalists” and “foreign terrorists” be maintained, for to admit otherwise is to switch from discourses of liberation to those of occupation’ (2004: 33). 2) The Politics of ‘Accidental’ Civilian Casualties in Iraq Discussion question From a normative perspective, how do we assign responsibility when ‘accidents’ during military interventions involve death to civilian populations? This is a more difficult question than at first glance because the meaning of an accident is never given (Der Derian, 2001). Alternative theorists suggest that governments and mainstream society attempt to normalise these events as unfortunate incidents for which the US and its allies cannot justifiably be held to account. Because specific non-combatant deaths were not wilfully intended as unique events, they should be classed as ‘accidents’; the United States and its allies cannot be held responsible (or even criticised). A decision to assign the label of ‘accident’ to an event, with its usually related idea of ‘no fault’, however, can be contested by different and unequal parties through arguments supporting particular social and ideological ends. During the Iraq War, the political and military leadership in the United States sought to portray all civilians who died as a result of the bombing campaign as having been killed ‘accidentally’. In response a number of writers have suggested that large numbers of civilian casualties have come to undermine – if not downright contradict – the humanitarian

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

claims made by the United States and its allies during and after the war. Alternative theorists question whether coalition forces can be held negligent or strictly liable for the accumulated deaths of civilians in discreet pockets – what Martin Shaw has called the ‘militarism of small massacres’ (2002). Box 5.2: Civilian Casualties in Iraq

Just as it is commonly suggested liberal citizens are especially averse to causing non- combatant death, the targeting of civilians is portrayed as something that only non-liberals do in spite of the historical evidence. Based on a quantitative analysis of all interstate wars between 1815 and 1999, Alexander Downes suggests democracies have been more likely to target civilians than non-democracies. Yet the comparison between the ‘due care’ taken by liberal states and the indiscriminate killing by terrorists or rogue regimes… has been constructed as so obviously valid as to be almost beyond question or doubt. Death appears like the ideal accident, where neither the victim nor the agent could possibly have been aware of the pending calamity hence neither can be held to account.

Owens, ‘Accidents Don’t Just Happen’, p.607-8 In addition to the effect of the 2003 war on civilians, feminist IR theory (see Chapter 17) focuses on the ways in which women were disproportionately affected by the sanctions regime that preceded the war, an analysis which could possibly be extended to the conduct of the war itself. Box 5.3: Sanctions and Women

[A liberal feminist study] might conclude that, while few women were involved in constructing and implementing the sanctions policy, women suffered more than their male counterparts, both through direct deprivation and through the effects of sanctions on their homes, families, and jobs.

J. Ann Tickner and Laura Sjoberg, “Feminism,” in International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity, 2007, p. 197 Feminists also note the presence of gender-based arguments and constructions in the Iraq war. As Tickner and Sjoberg note, Saddam Hussein threatened to show the US what a ‘real man’ he was, and the George H.W. Bush administration framed arguments of sanctions and war partially on the terms of protection of Iraqi women (Tickner and Sjoberg, 2007, p. 197). 3) Discourse Analysis and Iraq A major strength of poststructuralist scholarship is its ability to reveal the way in which political action cannot be understood outside of discourse, language and speech. It suggests that the meaning of a particular discourse is always contested and that ‘truth’ does not exist outside of (historically constructed political) discourse. As suggested in

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

ch.11 of Globalization, ‘various regimes of truth merely reflect the ways in which throughout history both power and truth develop together in a mutually sustaining relationship. The way to uncover the workings of power is to undertake a detailed historical analysis of how the practices and statements about the social world are only ‘true’ within specific discourses. Accordingly, post-modernism is concerned with how some discourses and therefore some truths dominate over others in very concrete ways’. A poststructuralist perspective, therefore, investigates how the Bush administration tried to establish the ‘truth’ of its interpretation of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the regime’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. It examines the rhetorical devises used in public statements that tried to convince the world of the threat and asks how the discourse about the war was started and controlled. It sees as central to the construction of the battlefield narrative the victory of the White House communications operation in presenting the war to an American audience. It might highlight the Pentagon’s decision to ’embed’ over 500 journalists with US troops during the invasion as a method of creating first-hand accounts sympathetic to the United States. From a poststructuralist perspective, content analysis of the mainstream media reveals how participant identities were constructed and represented in such a way as to make certain wartime actions possible.

 

 

Baylis, Smith and Owens: The Globalization of World Politics 6e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003

© Oxford University Press, 2014.

IR Theory in Practice Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003 Web links www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm Contains a link to UN Resolution 1441, which in November 2002 declared Iraq “in material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html This page on the White House website contains the text of President Bush’s address announcing the initiation of military action against Iraq in March 2003. www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq Although it was archived in May 2003 after President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations, this CNN website provides a snapshot of early coverage of the war. www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx The Iraq archive, run by the DC think tank the Brookings Institution, contains a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion, and security data, updated regularly. www.iraqbodycount.net This independent human security organization monitors civilian casualties in Iraq, based on media reporting. www.warphotoltd.com The website of this museum of war photojournalism, based in Dubrovnik, Croatia, contains partial displays of exhibitions related to the conflict in Iraq.

 

 

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