Comparative Politics Problem Set III

Complete the following questions.

1. (36 points) In �Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties,� Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether reli- gious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institu- tions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democ- racy as long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dicta- torship when they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.

The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime) that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party (Religious Party) that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections. The Religious Party is expected to win the elec- tions, and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support demo- cratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions, and that whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party’s type. Moderate religious par- ties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite. There are three possible out- comes in this game: Continued dictatorship, Religious dictatorship, and Democratic consolidation. The �gure below illustrates an incomplete in- formation version of this game with cardinal payo�s in which the Regime does not know whether it is interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party.

(a) Based on the cardinal payo�s shown in the �gure above, write down

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the preference ordering for (a) the Regime, (b) the moderate Reli- gious Party, and (c) the radical Religious Party over the three possible outcomes.

(b) Solve the subgame on the left, where the Religious Party is moder- ate, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the payo�s that each player receives?

(c) Solve the subgame on the right, where the Religious Party is radical, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equi- librium? What is the expected outcome? What are the payo�s that each player receives?

(d) What is the expected payo� for the Regime from �Cancel elections�?

(e) What is the expected payo� for the Regime from �Hold elections�?

(f) Use the expected payo�s from the two previous questions to calcu- late the critical probability at which the Regime will choose to hold elections rather than cancel them.

(g) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.75, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indi�erent between these two actions? Explain.

(h) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.8, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indi�erent between these two actions? Explain.

(i) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.5, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indi�erent between these two actions? Explain.

(j) If you represented a moderate religious party poised to win the elec- tions, would you want the Regime to believe that your party was moderate or radical?

(k) If you represented a radical religious party poised to win the elections, would you want the Regime to believe that your party was moderate or radical?

(l) If you solved the game correctly, you will �nd that the Regime will hold elections as long as it believes that the Religious Party is mod- erate with a high enough probability. If there is some uncertainty on the part of the Regime and you are representing a moderate re- ligious party that wants the elections to go ahead, why might it not be enough for you to simply announce to the Regime that your party is a moderate religious party and not a radical one?

2. (5 points) On September 17, 2011, protesters occupied Zuccotti Park in the �nancial district of New York as part of a movement that became known as �Occupy Wall Street� (OWS). Many of the protesters had been inspired by the popular uprisings that had occurred in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011. The OWS protesters were opposed to what they perceived

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Comparative Politics Problem Set III

to be the undue in�uence of banks and multinational corporations on the political system. They believed that the wealthiest 1 percent of society had a disproportionate share of capital and political in�uence, and they used the slogan �We are the 99%� to highlight the problem of social and economic inequality. The OWS led to the creation of the international Occupy Movement, which has organized protests in dozens of countries around the world. The occupation of Zuccotti Park ended on November 15, 2011, when the protesters were forcibly removed by the police. Imagine that you are discussing issues of inequality and the power of the �nancial sector with some of the �Occupy Wall Street� protesters in the fall of 2011. How would you explain the implications of the structural dependence of the state on capital to someone who doesn’t understand why left-wing parties do not always �expropriate� the rich when they come to power?

3. (24 points) Rather than classify regimes as either democratic or dictato- rial, selectorate theory characterizes all regimes in regard to their location in a two-dimensional institutional space. One dimension is the size of the selectorate (S), and the second dimension is the size of the winning coalition (W). These two dimensions are graphically shown in Figure 10.9 along with the types of regimes that fall into each cell. Use Internet and other resources to determine into which cell of the two-dimensional space in the �gure belwo each of the following regimes should be placed. Explain your answers.

(a) Guinea Bissau

(b) Iraq under Saddam Hussein (pre-2003)

(c) The United States in 1776

(d) The United Arab Emirates

(e) Chile under Augusto Pinochet

(f) Argentina

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4. (21 points) Suppose that a political leader raises $1 billion in tax revenue. Assume that the leader can supply public goods worth $2,000 to each individual in society if he spends all of this tax revenue on providing public goods. Assume also that the size of the winning coalition is 250,000. With all of this in mind, answer the following questions.

(a) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount?

(b) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this situation? Why?

(c) Now suppose that the size of the winning coalition is 750,000. Keep- ing everything else the same, answer the following questions.

(d) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount?

(e) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this new situation? Why?

(f) Based on the answers you have given and the description of selec- torate theory in this chapter, why is providing public goods a more e�cient way for leaders in democracies to stay in power?

(g) Based on the answers you have given and the description of selec- torate theory in this chapter, why is providing private goods a more e�cient way for leaders in dictatorships to stay in power?

5. (16 points) In this chapter, we discussed the rules for classifying democ- racies as parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential. Look at the information from the following constitutions and decide whether these democracies are parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential. Explain your decision.

(a) 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution

• Article 37: The President of Faso is elected for �ve years by universal, direct, equal and secret su�rage. He is re-eligible one time.

• Article 46: The President of Faso appoints the Prime Minister from among the majority of the National Assembly and terminates his func- tions, either on the presentation by him of his resignation, or on his own authority in the superior interest of the Nation. On the pro- posal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the other members of the Government and terminates their functions.

• Article 62: The Government is responsible before the Parliament in the conditions and following the procedures speci�ed by this Consti- tution.

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Comparative Politics Problem Set III

• Article 114: The reciprocal relations of the National Assembly and of the Government are expressed equally by: the motion of censure; the question of con�dence; the dissolution of the National Assembly; the procedure of parliamentary discussion.

• Article 115: The National Assembly can present a motion of censure with regard to the Government. The motion of censure is signed by at least one-third of the Deputies of the Assembly. To be adopted, it must be voted by an absolute majority of the members composing the Assembly. In case of rejection of the motion of censure, its signatories may not present another before the time period of one year.

(b) 1937 Irish Constitution

i. Article 12: There shall be a President of Ireland (Uachtarán na hÉire- ann), hereinafter called the President, who shall take precedence over all other persons in the State and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law. The President shall be elected by direct vote of the people.

ii. Article 13: The President shall, on the nomination of the Dáil Éireann, appoint the Taoiseach, that is, the head of the Government or Prime Minister. The president shall, on the nomination of the Taoiseach with the previous approval of Dáil Éireann, appoint the other members of the Government. The President shall, on the advice of the Taoiseach, accept the resignation or terminate the appointment of any member of the Government. Dáil Éireann shall be summoned and dissolved by the President on the advice of the Taoiseach. The President may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil Éireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dáil Éireann. . . The President shall not be answerable to either House of the Oireachtas or to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of his o�ce or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of these powers and functions.

iii. Article 15: The National Parliament shall be called and known, and is in this Constitution generally referred to, as the Oireachtas. The Oireachtas shall consist of the President and two Houses, viz.: a House of Representatives to be called Dáil Éireann and a Senate to be called Seanad Éireann.

iv. Article 28: The Government shall consist of not less than seven and not more than �fteen members who shall be appointed by the Pres- ident in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. . . The Government shall be responsible to the Dáil Éireann. The head of the government, or Prime Minister, shall be called, and is in this Consti- tution referred to as, the Taoiseach.

(c) 1980 Chilean Constitution

• Article 4: Chile is a democratic republic. • Article 24: The government and administration of the State are vested in the President of the Republic, who is the Chief of the State.

• Article 25: The President of the Republic shall hold o�ce for a term of eight years and may not be reelected for the consecutive period.

• Article 26: The President shall be elected by direct ballot, with an absolute majority of the votes validly cast.

• Article 32: The special powers vested in the President of the Republic are the following: . . . To appoint, and remove at will, Ministers of

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Comparative Politics Problem Set III

State, Undersecretaries, Intendants, Governors and Mayors appointed by him.

• Article 33: The Ministers of State are the direct and immediate col- laborators of the President of the Republic in governing and adminis- tering the State.

(d) 1947 Japanese Constitution

• Article 1: The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unit of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

• Article 4: The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided in the Constitution, and he shall not have powers related to government.

• Article 6: The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as desig- nated by the Diet.

• Article 41: The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.

• Article 42: The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

• Article 65: Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet. • Article 66: The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

• Article 69: If the House of Representatives passes a non-con�dence resolution, or rejects a con�dence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days.

6. (8 points) The table below shows the results from the 2016 legislative elections in South Korea.

(a) Based on the results, from which party would you expect the forma- teur to come if South Korea were a parliamentary democracy?

(b) South Korea is in fact a presidential democracy. In the 2012 presiden- tial elections, Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party (SP) was elected president, and following the 2016 legislative elections, she still had nearly two years left in her term. Based on this new information, from which party would you now expect the formateur to come? Why is this?

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Comparative Politics Problem Set III

7. (8 points) The table below shows the results from the Oslo district in the 2005 Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. In all of these questions, you should ignore the �others� category.

(a) Copy the table. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are to be allocated according to the Hare quota with largest remainders. Fill in your table and indicate how Oslo’s seventeen seats are allocated among the parties. How many automatic, remainder, and total seats does each party obtain?

(b) Now make another table and repeat the process using the Droop quota with largest remainders. Does the allocation of seats change?

13: Elections and Electoral Systems 581

b. The Afghan electoral system has been heavily criticized by numerous actors. In a 2012 briefing paper written for an independent research institute based in Afghanistan, political scientists Andrew Reynolds and John Carey wrote that “The SNTV electoral system came about by a path of missteps and was a disservice to the millions of Afghans who deserved a clear and transparent tool to craft their first truly democratic parliament. If the system is retained for subsequent elections, there is every reason to believe that the fragmentation and parochialism of the legislature will continue, that the parliament as a whole will be ineffective in articulating and representing broad national interests, and that incumbents who strong-arm and bribe their way into office will thrive” (2012, 17). Explain the basis for Reynolds and Carey’s criticisms, focusing on the problems typically associated with SNTV electoral systems.

c. If you were designing an electoral system for Afghanistan, what would it be and why?

How Do Electoral Systems Work?

5. In Table 13.14 we again show the results from the Oslo district in the 2005 Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. In all of these questions, you should ignore the “others” category.

a. Copy Table 13.14. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are to be allocated according to the Hare quota with largest remainders. Fill in your table and indicate how Oslo’s seventeen seats are allocated among the parties. How many automatic, remainder, and total seats does each party obtain?

Legislative Elections in Oslo, Norway, 2005 (Using Quota Systems)TaBle 13.14

Party

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834

Seats 17

Quota

Votes ÷ Quota

Automatic seats

Remainder

Remainder seats

Total seats

8. (12 points) As we note in the chapter, the actual number of parties com- peting in an election or winning seats is not necessarily a good re�ection of �how big� a country’s party system is. As a result, political scientists often prefer to use a measure of the e�ective number of parties in a country to capture party system size. If you recall, the e�ective number of electoral

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parties when there are four actual parties is calculated as e�ective number of electoral parties = 1

v21+v 2 2+v

2 3+v

2 4 where v1 is the vote share of party 1, v2

is the vote share of party 2, and so on. The e�ective number of legislative parties when there are four actual parties is calculated as e�ective number of legislative parties = 1

s21+s 2 2+s

2 3+s

2 4 where s1 is the seat share of party 1,

s2 is the seat share of party 2, and so on. These measures can easily be adapted to cases in which there are more parties or fewer parties. For example, the general formulas for the e�ective number of parties are

1 P∑ 1 v2i

(1)

1 P∑ 1 s2i

(2)

where P is the total number of actual parties. The table below shows the results from the 2014 legislative elections in South Africa. As you can see, thirty parties won votes and thirteen parties won seats. This would seem to suggest that South Africa has a large multiparty system. Answer the following questions.

(a) What is the e�ective number of electoral parties in the 2014 South African elections? What is the e�ective number of legislative parties? (You will probably want to use a calculator for this.)

(b) Compare the e�ective numbers of electoral and legislative parties in these elections with the actual number of parties winning votes and seats. Which measure-the actual or e�ective number of parties-does a better job, in your opinion, of capturing the size of the South African party system? Why? Are there circumstances in which you would be more likely to use the actual number of parties as the measure of party system size? Are there circumstances in which you would be more likely to use the e�ective number of parties?

(c) Based on your answers to the previous questions and the information in the table, what do you think is the most accurate classi�cation of the South African party system: nonpartisan, single party, one-party dominant, two party, or multiparty?

(d) Based on the e�ective numbers of electoral and legislative parties that you calculated, does the mechanical e�ect of South Africa’s electoral system introduce much distortion in the way that votes are translated into seats? Based on your answer to this question, what type of electoral system do you think South Africa employs a permissive or nonpermissive one? Use Internet resources to �nd out whether South Africa really does use a permissive or a nonpermissive electoral system.

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Make sure you explain how you arrive at your solution � you won’t receive partial credit for incorrect answers unless we can see that you have done a part of the problem correctly. It is your responsibility to convey the answers in a clear and neat manner. Your TA may give you more precise instructions and is permitted to penalize you for sloppy presentation. The problem set is due at the beginning of class on March 13.

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